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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the dissertation of David K. Blanchard for the Doctor of Philosophy in
Public Administration and Policy presented April 29, 1994.
Title: The Impact of Collective Bargaining on the Civil Service Merit System in
Oregon
This study examines the impact of collective bargaining on the civil service merit
system in the State of Oregon. Four topics of current interest are explored. The first is
a discussion of the status of collective bargaining and the civil service merit system
legislation. The second topic is an analysis of the extent to which the day-to-day
administration of public sector personnel functions is determined by the relative
influence of collective bargaining agreements and civil service rules. The third is the
impact of the collective bargaining model on the integrity of the merit principle. The
final topic addressed by this study is the implication of the relationship between
collective bargaining and civil service for the effective administration of public sector
personnel systems in the future.
This research utilized a multiple methods design. The data collection
methodology involved two approaches. The first was a document review of state
statutes, administrative rules, Employment Relations Board orders, and court decisions
2applicable to the civil service and collective bargaining. The second approach to data
collection employed a written survey designed to solicit the opinion of personnel
administrators and others in a position to have an opinion concerning the influence of
collective bargaining within their respective jurisdictions. Both qualitative and
quantitative methods of data analysis were employed to interpret the data. Qualitative
analysis of historical documents yielded descriptive information pertaining to such
factors as the proliferation of collective bargaining legislation and the rationale behind
such legislation. Quantitative survey data were summarized through the use of
descriptive statistics. In addition, qualitative survey data were analyzed using
techniques of narrative description and content analysis, which were applied to the
open ended survey responses and interview data. A combination of quantitative and
qualitative techniques were used in tandem with the expectation that such an approach
would contribute to a more thorough investigation of the research question and lead to
a better understanding of the impact which collective bargaining legislation may have
had on the civil service merit system than would the use of either technique alone.
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INTRODUCTION
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The purpose of this study is to explore the impact collective bargaining has had
on the civil service merit system (CSMS) in the State of Oregon. To answer this
question, the study explores four topics of current interest relative to the merit system
and collective bargaining models of public personnel administration.
The first topic of this study is a discussion of the current status of collective
bargaining legislation and the civil service merit system. The purpose of this appraisal
is to describe the status of Oregon's civil service merit system and illustrate the
influence that collective bargaining legislation, Employment Relations Board (ERB)
orders, and court decisions have had on the changes made to that system.
The second topic addressed by this study is an analysis of the extent to which the
day-to-day administration of public sector personnel functions is determined by the
relative influence of collective bargaining agreements and civil service rules. The
purpose was to determine what, according to practitioners, has been the practical effect
of any impact which collective bargaining may have had. This is accomplished by
means of a survey completed by 90 personnel administrators at the county and city
level of government.
The third topic which this study explores is the impact of the collective
bargaining model on the integrity of the merit principle. At the heart of this issue is
2the question of the compatibility of the civil service and collective bargaining systems
and the principle of merit.
The final issue addressed by this study is the implication of the relationship
between collective bargaining and civil service for the effective administration of
public sector personnel systems in the future. Having observed the development of the
civil service merit and collective bargaining systems of public sector employment
relations to the present, what might be the future course of development? Do the two
models, civil service/merit and collective bargaining, present inherently conflicting
paradigms of personnel administration as some writers have suggested or are they
compatible, perhaps even complimentary, systems?
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT STUDY
Lack of Prior Empirical Studies
The need for this study stems from the fact that there has been very little
empirical research undertaken to address the issues raised above. While the debate
over the compatibility of unionism and the public service dates from the ]830s when
federal shipyard employees struck in support of a ]0 hour work day, the nature of this
debate has been philosophic rather than pragmatic, just as its methods have been
theoretical rather than empirical. Certainly no such study has ever been undertaken
within Oregon at the scope of the present research. The reason for the lack of
empirical research is, in part, due to the fact that only relatively recently have many
states adopted legislation allowing collective bargaining. The first state to enact
3collective bargaining legislation (other than that banning its practice) was Wisconsin in
1962, while as of 1992, only 28 states have enacted such legislation. As these states
gain experience with collective bargaining, and as additional states adopt legislation
pennitting collective bargaining, we believe more empirical studies will result.
Another factor which may explain the scarcity of empiric31 studies is the nature of the
question. For the most part, the issue of public sector collective bargaining has been
treated as a legal one. As such, discourse concerning its impact has appeared
principally in employment relations board orders, court decisions, and law review
articles, while the focus of discussion has been the legal effect of statutory change.
Douglas,1 explored the statutory relationship between civil service merit systems
and labor relation systems in 28 states which had enacted public-sector collective
bargaining legislation through 1990. In his own review of the literature on the topic,
he concluded that the literature on civil service is voluminous, yet there is a paucity of
empirical research on the association between civil service merit systems and labor
relations systems. Even so, the scope of the Douglas study was limited to a content
analysis of public sector collective bargaining and merit legislation in those states
which provide for collective bargaining by public sector employees. Douglas did not
explore the relationship between collective bargaining and civil service at the local
government level but limited the scope of his investigation to the impact of collective
bargaining legislation at the state government level. The primary questions addressed
1 Douglas, Joel, M. "State Civil Service and Collective Bargaining: Systems in
Conflict," Public Administration Review, vol. 52 (2), March/April 1992, p. 163.
4by the Douglas study were to what extent and in what manner have labor relations
systems been accommodated by legislation dealing with existing civil service systems.
Topics governed by either civil service merit systems or collective bargaining can be
insulated from influence by the other in four ways. First, civil service merit systems
can be protected by legislation which mandates the continuation of, and adherence to,
the merit system. Douglas found this mechanism to be operational in nine states.
Second, civil service merit systems may be protected from influence by collective
bargaining if legislation designates certain topics to be under the exclusive influence of
such systems and not within the scope of collective bargaining. This approach was
found in ten states. These first two approaches reflect a philosophy that civil service
merit systems are the preferred means of governing personnel administration and that
adherence to merit principles is best achieved through a dominant merit system. A
third approach is the supremacy of collective bargaining over the civil service merit
system in matters of labor relations which can be specifically outlined by statute. In
such cases, collective bargaining agreements enjoy supremacy, and civil service
statutes are deemed subservient to collective bargaining in those areas for which
collective bargaining is either mandatory or permitted. This arrangement was found in
nine states. The fourth approach to the accommodation of the two systems is the
declaration of certain topics to be reserved as management rights. This approach,
according to Douglas, appears to weaken both collective bargaining and civil service
control over the personnel function while strengthening the position of the employer.
Management rights clauses were found in 11 state statutes. Douglas also found, in
5every state in which both civil service merit systems and collective bargaining exist,
that civil service legislation predates collective bargaining legislation and that civil
service merit systems continue to govern most of the traditional personnel functions
such as recruitment, selection, position classification, and performance appraisal. States
which allow collective bargaining typically negotiate such topics as compensation
rates, fringe benefits, grievance procedures, and union membership requirements.
Douglas concluded that although the influence of civil service merit systems on
personnel administration has been diminished by the rise of collective bargaining
legislation, collective bargaining had not replaced the civil service merit system as a
means of personnel administration in those states where the two systems coexist. A
major conclusion drawn by Douglas based on the fmdings of his research was that
there appears to be an emergence of dual personnel systems which attempt to integrate
competing aspects of civil service merit and collective bargaining systems. Not
surprisingly, in some jurisdictions civil service merit systems and collective bargaining
seem to coexist in a cooperative relationship, while in others the two systems appear
locked in conflict over jurisdictional and functional authority.
Perhaps the most comprehensive study of public sector unionism to date is the
field research undertaken by the Brookings Institution in the first half of 1969 (referred
to here as "the Brookings study"). That research project, "Studies of Unionism in
Government," undertook to study the effects of public employee unionism and
collective bargaining on the administration of public personnel systems in fifteen cities
and four urban counties including Multnomah County, Oregon. The findings of that
6study were presented in numerous articles and books, the first three of which are of
particular interest to the present study.
The first book, The Unions and the Cities, wri'.tf~n by Harry Wellington and
Ralph Winter in 1971/ speaks to the legal issues involved with collective bargaining
in the public sector. The principle thrust of the Wellington and Winter text is that
there are basic differences, with respect to the work performed as well as with respect
to the relationship between employer and employee, between the public and private
sector, and that because of these differences, the arguments in support of collective
bargaining in the private sector do not necessarily hold in the public sector. Claims
made in favor of collective bargaining in the private sector are: first, that collective
bargaining is a means to achieve industrial peace by promoting an understanding of
the position of the interests of each party; second, that collective bargaining is a means
of achieving industrial democracy by allowing participation of workers in their own
governance; third, that unions which bargain with employers represent employees in
the political arena as well;3 and fourth, that collective bargaining equalizes the
bargaining power of eh. ,rIloyers and employees. The authors argue that the first three of
these arguments can be- said to hold, at least to some extent, in the public sector as
well but that the fourth argument, that of equal bargaining power, is not relevant to the
employment relationship in public sector for two reasons. First, the authors argue that
2 Wellington, Harry H., and Winter, Ralph K., Jr., The Unions and the Cities, The
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1971.
3 Wellington, H. Labor and the Legal Process, Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 215-
238.
7to the extent that civil selVice or merit systems exist in the public sector the arbitrary
exercise of managerial power will be reduced. Second, the authors argue that, while in
the public sector the social costs of collective bargaining are largely economic and
driven by market forces, in the public sector the costs are less economic than political.
For instance, the decision to offer a low rate of pay for a particular job may made as a
result of pressure from special interests or a desire to promote the general welfare and
in substitution for higher welfare payments or an improved transit system which could
be gained by offering higher wages for the job in question. The general conclusion the
authors draw is a rejection of the claim that what's good for public employees is good
for the cities, counties and states of our nation.4
The second book in the series, Managing Local Governments Under Pressure,
written by David Stanley with the assistance of Carole Cooperand published the
following year, addresses the influence of unions on administrative practices of
selected cities and urban counties. The study examines the effect of collective
bargaining on several personnel functions including: hiring, promotion, training, and
grievances; job classification, pay, and benefits; work management and working
conditions. The study found little union impact on initial hiring procedures. The
authors attributed this lack to the acceptance of the merit principle by union leaders as
4 Wellington, Harry H., and Winter, Ralph K., Jr., The Unions and the Cities, The
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1971, p. 202.
5 Stanley, David T., Managing Local Governments Under Pressure, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1972.
8well as to the union's concentration of energy on other areas of personnel activity.6
Stahl, commenting on a different study, noted that if the unions exert effort to control
cilnditions of initial hire, it is usually because they are interested in influencing
procedures governing promotions, and promotion criteria is generally linked to section
criteria.7 Stanley and Cooper found the effect of unions on promotions to be modest,
although the effect of union activity on promotions was found to be greater than the
impact on initial hire. The unions included in the Brookings research generally strived
for the following goals in establishing promotion criteria: Filling vacancies, other than
entry level positions, from within the ranks of current government employees (the use
of state, county, or city promotional lists); filling vacancies within a given organization
unit by promotion from within that organization unit or department (the use of agency
promotional lists); giving present employees of the governmental unit some type of
preferential status, such as awarding points for work in a specific classification, when
positions are to be filled by open competition (the use of specialized job content);
limiting the use of or weight given to subjective management judgements such as oral
exams or performance ratings; and installing seniority as the determining or major
factor in selecting candidates for promotion.8 Generally speaking, unions in the
6 Stanley, David T., Managing Local Governments Under Pressure, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 32.
7 O. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration, (5th edition), 1962. p. 28. As
quoted in Feigenbaum, Charles, "Civil Service and Collective Bargaining: Conflict or
Compatibility," Public Personnel Management, May-June, 1974, p. 245.
8 Stanley, David T., Managing Local Governments Under Pressure, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 36.
jurisdictions covered by the Brookings study indicated little interest in the topic of
training except in the area of training for promotion. The study team speculated that
union interest in training would increase in the future because of the impact such
training can have on promotional decisions and because the ability of the unions to
provide such training would give them additional leverage in the area of promotion.
Grievances and discipline were found to be major areas of interest to unions in the
Brooking study. The study found an increase in the number of grievances as well as a
tendency to handle grievances in a more structured, formal manner than was the case
prior to unionization. Unions were found to have less influence in matters of discipline
than in resolution of grievances. However, the research team concluded that, as is the
case with training, the trend in matters of procedure by which to handle disciplinary
issues is to move from civil service to collective bargaining. Stanley found the major
impact of union activity on personnel practices was a weakening of what he termed
"management-by-itself,"9 by which he meant the unilateral decision-making process.
The third book of the series, Public Employee Unionism, written by Jack
StieberlO and published in 1973, discusses the differences between public and private
sector labor organizations, and examines the development of several different types of
employee organizations in the pubic sector (all public unions, mixed unions, state and
local employee associations, professional associations, and unions and associations
9 Stanley, David T., "What Are Unions Doing To The Merit System?," Public
Personnel Review, April 1970, p. 109.
10 Stieber, Jack, Public Employee Unionism: Structure, Growth, Policy, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1973.
10
representing what are referred to as the uniformed protective services). The largest all-
public union was the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME). AFSCME was originally organized to protect and promote civil service
for state and local government employees. One of the union's primary objectives was
to champion "the extension of the merit system to all non-policy determining positions
of all governmental jurisdictions. ,,11 It was not until 1960 that the promotion of
collective bargaining as a means of achieving the union's objectives became part of
AFSCME's mission. According to Stieber, mixed unions have not pressed as hard as
all public unions for the establishment of collective bargaining in the public sector,
most likely because the success of the union is not solely dependent upon it. Mixed
unions generally view civil service with mixed feelings in that, where there is neither
civil service nor collective bargaining, they seek the protection of civil service. On the
other hand, where civil service and collective bargaining co-exist the union argues the
superiority of the collective bargaining system. 12 Uniformed services unions (police
and fire), tend to work toward the establishment of legislation separate from that of
other public employees. In very general terms, the study found police organizations to
be in favor of the present civil service system with modifications, while fire fighters
tended to favor the replacement of civil service with collective bargaining. 13 Prior to
II Kramer, Leo. Labor's Paradox--The American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, N.Y. Wiley, 1962, p. 27.
12 Stieber, Jack, Public Employee Unionism: Structure, Growth, Policy, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1973, p. 120.
13 Stieber, Jack, Public Employee Unionism: Structure, Growth, Policy, The Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1973, p. 121.
11
1970, state and local associations were found to be generally opposed to collective
bargaining. However, after enactment of legislation allowing it, most associations
petitioned for certification.
Not surprisingly, the study also found public employee labor organizations to be
related to city size and geographic location. Larger cities have a higher proportion of
organized employees than smaller cities. The study found that in cities of 10,000 or
more approximately 60% of all employees were represented by employee
organizations. Also, cities in the Mid-Atlantic, New England, East North Central, and
Pacific states had higher proportions of employees as members of public employee
organizations than did states in the South and Mountain states.
Although the Brookings studies were empirical in nature, they certainly may be
considered somewhat dated today. In fact, the field research which took place in early
1969 coincided with the first year in which collective bargaining was mandated for
those counties in Oregon required to have a civil service system as discusse1 on page
38. The major piece of legislation governing public sector bargaining in Oregon did
not become legally effective until October, 1973, four years after completion of the
Brookings study. Collective bargaining did not became practically effective on a
widespread basis until 1974, following the enactment of the 1973 legislation. Because
of the lack of recent empirical inquiry, questions remain as to the impact of collective
bargaining on the civil service merit system on several fronts. This study will address
those questions. Before beginning an examination of the specific issues addressed by
12
this study, a discussion of the reasons why we might expect there to be conflict
between these two systems of personnel management is in order.
The Conflicting Nature of the Two Systems
The potential for conflict between the two systems arises because the values and
objectives of collective bargaining differ from those of the civil service/merit system in
several important ways.
The civil service system is based on a unilateral decision-making model designed
with the dual objectives of protecting the individual's employment rights while
providing for administrative efficiency. It does this by promulgating a set of rules as
well as the procedures by which to enforce them. Under the civil service model, the
power to determine wages and conditions of employment remain in the hands of the
employer.
The collective bargaining system, in contrast, is based on a bilateral decision-
making model designed with the objectives of protecting the individual's employment
rights while providing for their economic interests. It does this by attempting to
equalize the balance of power to determine wages and conditions of work between the
state and its employees through their association with a labor organization. The
collective bargaining procedure provides for bilateral establishment of rules and
procedures of contract negotiation and for the negotiation of conditions related to
employment relations. It also provides for enforcement of the collective bargaining
agreement through the establishment of grievance procedures and a process of
arbitration. The conflicting nature of the two systems gives rise to several issues.
13
The Issues
A major controversy in the debate concerning the compatibility of the collective
bargaining and the civil service merit systems centers around the issue of preserving
the integrity of the merit system. Disagreement exists among scholars and practitioners
alike over what range of rersonnel functions is considered essential to be excluded
from bargaining in order to maintain the essence of the merit system. 14 According to
Kearney, 38 states have enacted merit standards conforming to the Intergovernmental
Personnel Act of 1970.15 As outlined in that act, the following six elements are
considered essential to the preservation of the merit principle: 1. Recruitment,
selection, and advancement of employees should be made on the basis of relative
ability, knowledge, and skills, including open consideration of qualified applicants for
initial appointment. 2. equitable and adequate compensation, 3. training to insure high
quality performance, 4. correction of inadequate performance or separation of those
whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected, 5. Fair treatment of all employees
in all aspects of personnel administration without regard to political affiliation, race,
color, national origin, sex, or religion, 6. protection of employees against partisan
political coercion.
Public employee unions, on the other hand, argue that many of the components
considered by public sector employers to be essential to the integrity of the merit
14 Kearney, Richard C., Labor Relations in the Public Sector, Marcel Dekker, New
York, 1984, p. 167.
15 Intergovernmental Personnel Act, Public Law 91-648.
14
system should be subject to collective bargaining. Among these are wage and benefit
determination, position classification, training provisions, and grievance procedures.
A second controversy involves the erosion of the authority of public managers to
unilaterally decide the terms and conditions of employment. The general argument
against this trend is that a main purpose of the civil service system is efficiency, that
collective bargaining is encumbering the personnel system, and that the existence of a
dual system of personnel management is necessarily less efficient than a single system.
A third issue concerning the potential conflict of collective bargaining and the
merit system centers on the direction which the continued development of these two
systems will take. On this issue there are generally three schools of thought. The first
is that collective bargaining and civil service merit systems are incompatible systems
destined for coexistence yet doomed to everlasting conflict. The second is that, since
the two are irreconcilable, one or the other system will prevail; the third view is that
the two systems are compatible and can exist in a symbiotic relationship if the merit
system is willing to accommodate certain basic tenets of collective bargaining, such as
the principle of bilateral decision making. 16
THE MERIT PRINCIPLE
In order to better understand the issues surrounding the debate over the
compatibility of the civil service and collective bargaining models of personnel
16 Kearney, Richard C., Labor Relations in the Public Sector, Marcel Dekker, New
York, 1984, p. 170.
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administration, it is first necessary to understand the distinction between the merit
principle and civil service merit systems. Discussion of this difference necessarily
begins at the federal level.
Both the merit principle and the civil service merit systems are products of the
civil service reform movement which began to gain momentum following the
assassination of President Garfield by Charles J. Guiteau, a disgruntled job seeker, in
1883. 17 Until that time, the spoils system was the dominant means of filling (and
creating) vacancies in government service. The purpose of the reform movement was
twofold: to insure the political neutrality of civil servants by removing them from the
political pressure of a patronage system and to encourage a new system of selection,
retention, and promotion of employees based on principles of merit or competence.
The values which underlie this system of selection and promotion, known as the merit
principle, are found in the civil service reform act of 1978 and outlined by Klinger and
Nalbandian as follows: 18
1. Recruitment should be from qualified individuals from appropriate sources in
an endeavor to achieve a work force from all segments of society, and selection
and advancement should be determined solely on the basis of relative ability,
knowledge, and skills after a fair and open competition, which assures that all
receive equal opportunity. 2. All employees and applicants for employment
17 Klinger, Donald E., and Nalbandian, John, Public Personnel Management Contexts
and Strategies, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1993, p. 12.
18 Klinger, Donald E., and Nalbandian, John, Public Personnel Management Contexts
and Strategies, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1993, p. 13.
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should receive fair and equitable treatment in all aspects of personnel
management without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, marital status, age, or handicapping condition, and with proper regard
for their privacy and constitutional rights. 3. Equal pay should be provided for
work of equal value with appropriate consideration of both national and local
rates paid by employers in the private sector, and appropriate incentives and
recognition should be provided for excellence in performance. 4. All employees
should maintain high standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for public
interest. 5. The work force should be used efficiently and effectively. 6.
Employees should be retained on the basis of adequacy of their perfonnance,
inadequate performance should be corrected, and employees should be separated
who cannot or will not improve their performance to meet required standards. 7.
Employees should be provided effective education and training in cases which
such education and training would result in better organizational and individual
performance. 8. Employees should be: a. protected against arbitrary action,
personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes; and b. prohibited
from using their official authority to influence for the purpose of interfering with
or affecting the result of an election or a nomination for election. 9. Employees
should be protected against reprisal for the lawful disclosure of information
which the employees reasonably believe evidences: a. a violation of any law,
rule, or regulation; or b. mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.
17
These principles reflect what Hugh Heclo described as the civil selVice ideal,
characterized by open access to jobs, competitively determined selection and career
advancement, discipline and/or removal from a position only for non-performance and
not for partisan reasons, and political neutrality of public employees in both
employment and partisan political activities. 19
CIVIL SERVICE MERIT SYSTEMS
The merit principle can be considered a statement of values or a public policy
statement declaring the basis for recruitment, selection, retention, and promotion of
public employees within the merit system. In contras" the merit system is a model of
civil selVice personnel administration based on the values expressed in the merit
principle. David Stanley draws the following distinction between the merit principle
and merit systems:
The merit principle is the basis on which employees are recruited, selected, and
advanced under conditions of political neutrality, equal opportunity, and
competition on the basis of merit and competence. When we say merit systems,
however, this has come to mean a broad program of personnel activities. Some
are essential to carrying out the merit principle: recruiting, selecting, policing of
anti-politics and anti-discrimination rules, and administering related appeals
provisions. Others are closely related and desirable: position classification, pay
19 A Government of Strangers, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1977, p.
20.
18
administration, employee benefits, and training.20
The following sections offer a brief description of the development of the civil service
system at the Federal and State level.
The Federal System
Certainly as a response to the pressures of the civil service reform movement, but
also undoubtedly spurred by reaction to the assassination of President Garfield,
Congress passed the original civil service act known as the Pendleton Act of 1883.
The Pendleton Act established a bipartisan federal Civil Service Commission which
was charged with the dual tasks of ensuring the end of political patronage and
overseeing a new system which would implement selection and promotion criteria
based on the principle of merit. According to Stahl,21 the major features of the
Pendleton Act were: 1. administration vested in the hands of an independent bipartisan
commission, appointed by and responsible to the chief executive, 2. selection by open
competitive and practical examination, 3. a probation period as part of the selection
process, 4. disabled veteran preference provisions, 5. freedom of employees from any
obligation to make political contributions, 6. authorization of the commission to
undertake independent investigation, 7. discretion of the president to extend the
classified service and to prescribe exemption from it.
20 Stanley, David T., "What Are Unions Doing To The Merit System?," Public
Personnel Review, April 1970, p. 109.
21 Mosher, William, E., Kingsley, Donald, 1., and Stahl, Glenn, 0., Public Personnel
Administration, (3rd edition), Harper & Brothers Publishers, N.Y., 1962 p. 26.
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In discussing the civil service merit system in general, Stahl has defined it as:
"A personnel system in which competitive merit or achievement governs each
individual's selection and progress in the service and in which the conditions and
rewards of performance contribute to the competency and continuity of the service. ,,22
A key provision of the civil service which is not included in Stahl's definition is
that of unilateral decision making.
Robert Hastings,23 past general counsel of the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees, points out that while the civil service concept is
generally understood to mean recruitment or selection, promotion, and job retention
based on merit and fitness, it also includes unilateral determination of wages, fringe
benefits, and other conditions of employment such as hours of work. Additionally, in
disciplinary actions there are appeals to a civil service board or civil selVice
commission appointed by the public employer.
Oregon's Civil Service System
The establishment of the state civil service merit systems followed that of the
federal system with varying levels of enthusiasm. The first state systems to be
established were those of New York and Massachusetts in 1883 and 1884 respectively.
22 O. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration, (5th edition), 1962, p. 28. As
quoted in Feigenbaum, Charles, "Civil Service and Collective Bargaining: Conflict or
Compatibility," Public Personnel Management, May-June, 1974, p. 245.
23 Hastings, Robert, H, "The Public Employee Union Looks at Collective Bargaining
in the Public Sector," in A Conference Report of the Fifth Annual Dryfoos Conference
on Public Affairs: Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, The Public Affairs
Center, Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H, 1968, p. 49.
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By 1940, nineteen states had established some sort of merit system. In that year,
establishment of state civil service merit systems was mandated under certain
conditions as a result of the Social Security Act of 1940. In accordance with that act,
all civil employees of state and local jurisdictions whose salaries or programs were
funded under federal grant-in-aid funds were required to be hired under a system of
merit similar to that of the federal service.24 Oregon, in 1945, became the 23rd state to
establish such a system. Oregon actually has a three tier system of legislation
governing its civil service merit systems. The three statutes (DRS chapters 240, 241,
and 242) govern civil service merit systems for state, county, and local employees
respectively. The Oregon statutes governing Civil Service for the State (ORS 240),
Counties (ORS 241), and Civil Service for City or School District Employees and Fire
Fighters (ORS 242), each specify that a system of merit must be observed in
consideration of appointments and promotions in the civil service. However, none of
the statutes makes a formal distinction between the two terms "civil service system"
and "merit system." Because of their intimate relationship (both the civil service
system and merit systems generally are intended to preserve the principle of merit and
govern personnel practices in the civil service), the two terms "merit system" and
"civil service system" have become virtually synonymous in both the academic
literature and in practical use. Therefore, the two terms will be treated as synonymous
in this paper.
24 Kearney, Richard C., Labor Relations in the Public Sector, Marcel Dekker, New
York, 1984, p. 167.
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The objective of this study is to explore the impact which collective bargaining
may have had on the merit systems at the county and local government levels in the
state of Oregon. Although the language of DRS 240 does not specifically address the
civil service at the county and local government level, the presentation of a brief
overview of the civil service statutes pertaining to all three levels of government will
help to place the focal issue in context.
DRS 240
The purpose of Oregon revised Statutes Chapter 240, State Personnel Relations,
is to establish for the state a system of personnel administration based on merit
principles?S The Oregon Revised Statutes chapter 240 section .235, Compensation plan
for classified service, directs the personnel division (Division), to establish and
implement a merit pay system. Sub-section (I) of section .306, which governs
recruitment selection, and promotion criteria and procedures for state employees directs
that:
Recruitment, selection, and promotion of state employees shall be on the basis of
merit determined by open competition, without regard to an individual's race,
color, religion, sex, marital status, national origin, political affiliation, age,
disability, or other non-job-related factors. Subsection (4) states that,
"Appointments to positions in state service shall be made on the basis of
qualifications and merit by selection from eligible lists established by the division
2S ORS 240.010.
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or a delegated operating agency."
subsection (7) provides that:
The division or delegated agencies shall establish systems to provide
opportunities for promotion through meritorious seIVice, training, education, and
career development assignments. The division shall certify to the eligibility of
persons selected for promotion or delegate that responsibility to operating
agencies in appropriate situations. Provision shall be made to bring into state
seIVice through open competition at higher levels where such competition
provides abilities not available among existing employees, enrich state seIVice or
contribute to improved employment opportunity for under represented groups.
Section .316 of chapter 240 sets out conditions under which an appointing authority
has discretion to subject an employee to a period of trial seIVice and directs that
procedures shall be established by the division for the layoff and opportunity for
reemployment of employees separated for reasons other than cause, for the transfer,
discipline, or demotion of employees for the good of the seIVice, or the dismissal of
employees for cause. The language of ORS 240 specifically states that recruitment,
selection, and promotion of employees shall be made on the basis of merit and that the
appointing authority has discretion in matters of performance appraisal (trial seIVice),
discipline, and discharge. Section .430 of DRS 240 directs the personnel division to
establish a system of merit ratings to determine the quality of performance and relative
merit of employees in the classified seIVice, and section .551 directs the division to
establish working hours, holidays, leaves of absence and vacations of employees in
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state classified service.
ORS 241
Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) chapter 241 governs the establishment and
administration of county civil service systems. Most county employees are covered
under the provisions of ORS 241. County fire fighters, however, are covered under
ORS 242.702 to 242.824.26 All appointees to positions in the public service of the
county are subject to civil service, except as noted in the following sections of ORS
241.025:
241.025 (1) Any officer chosen by popular election, or appointed to fill a
vacancy caused by the death, resignation, or removal of any officer chosen by
poplar election (2) Any official reporter, bailiff or crier, subject to appointment
by any court or judge or justice thereof. (3) Any person employed to perform
manual labor, skilled or unskilled, in construction, maintenance, and repair of
county property; provided that electrical workers, members of road and bridge
crews, and laborers permanently employed shall be subject to civil service unless
otherwise provided in ORS 241.020 to 241.990. (4) Any special deputy sheriff or
deputy constable appointed to act without compensation from the county. (5) Any
member of the county civil service commission. (6) Any deputy district attorney
(7) Any doctor, nurse, intern, or superintendent or other executive officer,
employed by, in or at the county hospital, county or farm, or any home
26 ORS 241.006 (2).
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maintained by the county for the detention or care of juveniles. (8) The road
master of the county. (9) Any temporary, part-time or seasonal employee. (10)
Any person holding a position subject to the jurisdiction of the commission
created by ORS 242.706. (11) Any chief examiner appointed under ORS
242.716. (12) Any assistants to a board of county commissioners. (13) Any
undersheriff, deputy undersheriff, or administrative aide to a sheriff.
Counties subject to ORS 241.020 through 241.990 include those with a
population of 500,000 or more persons.27 Additionally, any county may establish a
civil service system by either initiative or referendum. 28 Any county that does establish
a civil service system must also establish a civil service commission whose function it
is to oversee administration of the civil service system?9 Civil service commissions
consist of three members, appointed by the board of county commissioners, whose
term of office is six years with the term of one commissioner expiring every two
years. 30 The purpose of the commission is to make suitable regulations, not
inconsistent with ORS 241.020 through 241.990 and to carry out the provisions of
ORS 241.020 through 241.990. The regulations must provide in detail the manner in
which examinations shall be held and appointments, promotions, transfers,
27 ORS 241.020.
28 ORS 241.009.
29 ORS 241.020-990.
30 ORS 241.075.
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reinstatements, suspensions, and discharges shall be made.3) DRS 241.120 through
241.130 grants county civil service commissions the power to investigate and hold
hearings on matters related to the civil service system as well as to administer oaths
and subpoena witnesses.
Classification and compensation plans, and the selection and promotion of employees,
is covered by ORS 241.205 through 241.300. ORS 241.205 outlines the basis of
appointment and promotion generally:
Except as otherwise expressly provided in ORS 241.020 to 241.990, the
appointment and promotion of all persons to or in all positions subject to the
provisions of OS 241.020 to 241.990 shall be made solely upon merit, efficiency,
and fitness, which shall be ascertained by open competitive examination and
impartial investigation.
ORS 241 directs the board of county commissioners to control creation of positions
and fixing of compensation. ORS 241.210 states that, "All positions subject to civil
service in the county shall be created by the board of county commissioners and the
board is authorized to fix the compensation of all employees employed therein." ORS
241.215 speaks to classification and compensation.
(1) The commission shall classify, with respect to the examinations provided for
in DRS 241.020 to 241.990, all positions in the public service of the county to
which DRS 241.020 to 241.990 applies. The classifications shall be based upon
the respective functions of the positions and the compensation attached thereto,
31 ORS 241.110 (1).
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and shall be arranged so as to permit the grading of positions of like character in
groups and subdivisions to the end that like compensation shall be paid for like
duties. (2) The commission shall establish maximum and minimum salary limits
for each grade 0 the basis of efficiency and length of service. (3) The
classification and grades may, from time to time, be amended, added to,
consolidated or abolished by the commission, but no person holding any position
under any established classification or grade shall be affected by ant such change
so as to deprive the person of any of the benefits attached to the classification or
grade applicable to the position then held by the person. (4) The positions so
classified and graded shall constitute the classified civil service of the county.
ORS 241 establishes procedures for the administration of examinations and
certification of candidates for vacancies.32 Section .295 of chapter 241 provides that no
appointment or promotion to any position in the classified civil service of the county
shall be made except in the manner provided in ORS 241.020 to 241.990. Sections
.405 through .460 govern procedures to be followed concerning leaves of absence/3
transfers, and reinstatement,34 suspension,35 and dismissa1.36
32 ORS 241.220 - 285.
33 ORS 241.405.
34 ORS 241.415.
35 ORS 241.420.
36 ORS 241.425 - 241.460.
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ORS 242
Chapter 242 of the Oregon Revised Statutes governs civil service for three
specific classes of employees: employees of annexed districts, city or school district
custodial employees, and fire fighters. ORS 242.050 provides for coverage of
employees of districts annexed by a city that operates under a civil service system.
Whenever any rural fire protection, water or sanitary district becomes partially or
wholly absorbed into a city which operates under a system of civil service for its
employees, notwithstanding the civil service provisions of law or such city's
charter, the governing body of the city may, at its option, provide for inclusion of
any or all the employees of the district as employees of the city under its civil
service system with or without civil service examinations, in a manner
determined by the exercise of the sound discretion of the governing body.
ORS 242.330 addresses coverage of school custodians:
In all school districts having a population of 300,000 or more persons according
to the last federal census, there is created a civil service board with jurisdiction
over the appointment, employment, classification, and discharge of custodians
and assistant custodians in the employ of the school district.
Section .520 of ORS 242 mandates adherence to a system of merit:
(1) No appointment or promotion shall be made except as provided in the
Custodian's civil service law. All appointments to beginning employment
positions in the classified civil service shall be made according to fitness, to be
ascertained by open competitive examinations. All promotions in the classified
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civil selVice shall be made according to merit in selVice, fidelity in selVice, and
seniority in selVice.
As does DRS 241, DRS 242 establishes procedures for certification and appointment
of candidates for vacancies,37 suspension, dismissal, appeal, and reappointment.38
Civil selVice for fire fighters is specifically addressed under DRS 242.702
through 242.824. The political subdivisions and positions to which ORS 242.702 to
242.824 do not apply are specified in ORS 242.704:
(1) ORS 242.702 to 242.824 do not apply to any political subdivision which
under its charter, ordinances or regulations has a civil selVice system covering
the employees of its fire department which substantially accomplishes the general
purposes of DRS 242.702 to 242.824. However, such political subdivision shall
retain such exemption only so long as the civil selVice system upon which the
exemption is based remains in effect. (2) The civil selVice shall include all
employees of the fire department of a political subdivision which employs four or
more fire fighters on a full-time basis, not including the chief. The governing
body of the political subdivision shall decide whether the chief may be a member
of the civil selVice.
nle civil service system for fire fighters is similar to that of other civil selVice
employees under DRS 242. The main differences are that fire fighters have a
probationary period of 12 instead of 6 months and leaves of absence for fire fighters
37 DRS 242.570.
38 242.610-242.635.
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may be granted without pay for longer periods than other employees without the
consent of the civil service commission.39 Also, whereas non-fire fighting personnel
may be suspended for a period of up to 30 days without the right to review, fire
fighters suspended for any length of time may appeal to the civil service commission.
Finally, the civil service commission governing fire fighters has no authority to
establish salary ranges as does the commission governing other employees.
In summary, the goals of any civil service/merit system, whether federal, state or
local, are five fold: (1) to secure the best qualified work force, (2) to provide equal
opportunity in employment with respect to selection and promotion, (3) to protect
employees against unfair dismissal or other disciplinary actions, (4) to provide an
avenue of appeal when disputes do arise, and (5) to provide efficiency in the
administration of public policy. The first four goals of the merit system can be seen
as insuring adherence to the merit principle. The merit system accomplishes this by
specifically prescribing the criteria and procedures for recruitment, selection, and
promotion and by establishing a means through which the conduct and performance of
civil servants can be held accountable to the general will of the people by insuring
accountability to those who are elected to office. The fifth goal of the civil service
system is to enhance the efficiency of public administration. Public administration
according to Corson and Harris consists of
decision making, planning the work to be done, formulating objectives and goals,
working with the legislature and citizen organizations to gain public support and
39 ORS 242.766 (1).
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funds for government programs, establishing and revising organization, directing
and supervising employees, providing leadership, communicating and receiving
communications, determining work methods, and procedures, appraising
performance, exercising controls, and other functions performed by government
executives and supervisors. It is the action part of government, the means by
which the purposes and goals of government are realized.40
In an obviously streamlined view of policy formulation and implementation, public
policy is determined by elected or appointed government officials in accordance with
the will of the people. Policy thus determined is implemented by government
employees who are selected by these same officials to carry out the work of
government. The civil service system is meant to be a means by which to bring about
efficiency in the administration of public policy through the effective administration of
public personnel management. In this respect, it can be said that the civil service merit
system exists to effect the efficient management of human resources necessary for the
accomplishment of government work while maintaining adherence to the merit
principle.
THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEM
Chester Newland defines collective bargaining as a legaUy defined system for
40 Corson, John 1. and Harris, Joseph P., Public Administration in Modem Society,
McGraw Hill, 1963, p. 12. Quoted in Stanley, David T. Managing Local Government
Under Pressure, Studies of Unionism in Government, Brookings Institution,
Washington, D.C., 1972, p. 4.
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resolving conflicts, solving problems, and promoting common goals of management
and organized employees. The basic concepts of collective bargaining according to
Newland are identified as 1. exclusive representation within legally established
bargaining units, 2. enforcement of good faith bargaining through legal maintenance of
the bargaining process but without prescription of bargaining ends, 3. legal
enforceability of agreements for a fixed period of time, 4. legal differentiation between
types of disputes and remedies, 5. Bargaining processes and legal remedies, such as
arbitration, based on concepts of fairness and flexibility -- a search for organizational
justice or reasonableness:H
Dunlop's Industrial Relations Model
Beal, Wickersham, and Kienast have adopted the model of industrial relations
proposed by Dunlop.42 Briefly, Dunlop defines the industrial relations system as a set
of relationships between actors which can be studied the way economists study market
relationships or political scientists study power relationships. This industrial relations
system can be studied in terms of three contexts: the context of the market, the context
of work place technology, and the context of power relations of society as manifested
in the work place. In Dunlop's model, the actors interact for the purpose of
41 Newland, Chester A., "Public Personnel Administration: Legalistic Reforms v.
Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Economy," Public Administration Review,
September/October 1976, p 534.
42 Dunlop, John T., Industrial Relations Systems, in Beal, Edwin F., Wickersham,
Edward D., and Kienast, Philip K., The Practice of Collective Bargaining, Richard D.
Erwin, inc., Homeward lllinois, 1976, p. 4.
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establishing substantive rules by which to govern their relationships. According to Beal
et aI, Dunlop stopped short of specifying what the actors make rules about, what issues
the rules deal with and try to resolve, what functions the rules fill that need to be
provided for, and perhaps most importantly, what the rules for rule making are.
Accordingly, Beal et a1. have expanded Dunlop's industrial relations model to outline
the rules by which employment relationships are governed and contrast what they refer
to as the rules for rule making in union and non-union employment relationships.43 TIle
rules governing these employment relationships and the functions of the labor
agreement are discussed below and summarized in Figure 1 which appears on page 33.
The first rule, central to both union and non-union relationships, is the wage and effort
bargain. The wage and effort bargain refers to an exchange of the worker's time and
talent in return for compensation from the employe. The scope of this exchange
comprises five elements: (1) pay for time worked, (2) the effort bargain, which
determines production standards, (3) premium pay, (4) pay for non-work time such as
vacation and holidays, and (5) contingent benefits such as insurance and pensions.
In addition to the wage and effort bargain, mechanisms to address concerns
regarding what under collective bargaining would be called individual security
measures may develop even under non-union conditions. TIle scope of individual
security includes an individual worker's relative claim to available work and the
absolute claim for fair treatment on the job.
43 Beal, Edwin F., Wickersham, Edward D., and Kienast, Philip K., The Practice of
Collective Bargaining, Richard D. Erwin, Inc., Homeward TIlin3is, 1976, pp. 16-18.
FUNCTION CATEGORY
I a. The bargaining unit
Union Security and b. Form of recognition
Management Rights c. Duration and renewal
d. Management rights
SCOPE
a. Who speaks for whom
b. With what authority
c. For how long
d. Except in what conditions
33
II
The Wage and
Effort Bargain
a. Pay for time worked a. Day and base rates; job
b. Effort expended evaluation
c. Pay for time not worked b. Standards
III
Individual Security
IV
Administration
d. Contingent benefits
a. Job rights
b. Due process
a. Internal
b. External
c. Hours: duration
d. Fixed labor costs
e. Variable labor costs
a. Relative claim to available
work; seniority
b. Absolute claim to fair
treatment; grievance
procedures
a. On-the-job representation
b. Arbitration
Figure 1. Functions of the Labor Agreement. 44
44 From: Beal, Edwin F., Wickersham, Edward D., and Kienast, PlIilip K., The Practice
of Collective Bargaining, Richard D. Erwin, Inc., Homeward lllinois, 1976, p. 251.
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The relative claim to available work, sometimes called job rights, gives rise to
rules governing who gets available overtime work, who gets laid off, and who gets
recalled when. The worker's absolute claim to fair treatment, or the establishment of a
system of due process, gives rise to rules governing such issues as discipline and
grievance procedures.
Under non-union conditions, employers must consider all five elements of the
wage and effort bargain in establishing the conditions which constitute their offer of
employment, and workers must weigh the value of an individual employer's offer
against other opportunities and the value of leisure in deciding to accept or reject an
offer. Nonetheless, under a non-union system the rules on the wage and effort bargain,
as well as the rules on individual security, are established unilaterally by the employer.
In the private sector these rules are generally implicit, and even if they do exist in
written form, the rules may not be binding on the employer who is free to change
them at will. In the public sector the rules are generally written in the form of
personnel rules and policies. As pointed out by Robert Hastings, although they may be
more binding on the public sector employer, the rules themselves are no less
unilaterally derived than in the private sector.
Under a union system, the rules of the employment relationship take on a
different nature. Under collective bargaining, the rules are not established unilaterally
nor are they implicit. A collective bargaining system is characterized by the existence
of a bilaterally negotiated, written, and binding labor agreement which explicitly spells
out the rules of employment for those employees covered by the agreement. Although
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the collective bargaining employment relationship continues to center on the wage and
effort bargain, and mechanisms to address concerns with individual security still exist,
there are two additional rules of a union employment relationship which distinguish it
from a non-union one. The first of these is specific contract language which outlines
what Beal et ai, refer to as the rules for rule making, such as establishing the range of
topics considered negotiable while enumerating the elements of the employment
relationship considered to be prerogatives of management. These rules for rule making,
explicitly written into labor agreements, are referred to as union security and
management rights clauses. Union security and management rights provide answers to
four questions: who speaks for whom, with what authority, for how long, and with
what exceptions. The second element which distinguishes union from non-union
employment relationships is the provision for joint administration of matters relating to
the execution of the employment agreement such as on-the-job representation as well
as mediation and arbitration of disputes.
The existence of employee organizations in the public sector dates to the
beginning of the American labor movement. Collective bargaining in the public sector,
however, did not begin to gain a foothold until the 1960s.45 As this is a treatise on the
impact rather than the development of public sector collective bargaining, we will not
linger on the national history of collective bargaining nor on the similarities and
distinctions between private and public sector organizing. Suffice it to say that
45 Spero, S.D., and Capozzola, John M., The Urban Community and Its Urbanized
Bureaucracies, Cambridge University Press, Dunellen Publishing Co., N.Y., 1973, p.
15.
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collective bargaining, in the civil service as in the private sector, originated in part
with the desire by individual workers to have a greater voice in the determination of
the wages for and conditions under which they worked. The resources of a single
employee contribute very little to bargaining power compared to the resources that can
be mustered through collective effort. This is so because, among other reasons, the
supply of workers competent to perform a given task outnumbers the supply of
employers for whom the task can be performed. As a result, an individual is generally
powerless should an employer adopt a "take it or leave it" attitude concerning wages
and other conditions of work. It is only by collective action that most workers can
hope to equalize the balance of negotiating power between themselves and their.
employers.
Oregon's Collective Bargaining History
In 1959, the state AFL-CIO sponsored a bill granting public employees the right
to organize and bargain over matters regarding employment relations. The bill sought
to "authorize and direct" state and local agencies to enter into collective bargaining
agreements with unions or councils of unions representing their employees.46 The bill
received opposition from the League of Oregon Cities and was amended to authorize,
but not require, collective bargaining. The bill was passed by the legislature but was
vetoed by Governor Mark Hatfield. In 1961 another collective bargaining bill was
introduced, again by the AFL-CIO, but it never got out of committee.
46 Or. H.B. 138, 50th session (1959).
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In 1963, the AFL-CIO again sponsored, and the legislature passed, a bill which
permitted but did not mandate public employee collective bargaining.'H This 1963 law
gave employees the right to bargain over matters concerning employment relations, a
term which included but was not limited to wages, salaries, hours, vacations, sick
leave, holiday pay, and grievance procedures. The law gave employers the right to
enter into collective bargaining agreements with public employees and provided that
the State Conciliation Service could be used to resolve public sector labor disputes. It
also contained a prohibition against public employr.e strikes. The 1963 law did not
provide procedures for establishing bargaining units or conducting representation
elections nor did it establish a definite structure for bargaining. Since the law was
viewed as one which permitted but did not mandate bargaining, only a few local
governments began bargaining at this point and there was no state level bargaining
taking place.
As a result of efforts by the Oregon Education Association (OEA) during the
1965 session, public school teachers were removed from the public sector bargaining
statute and a meet and confer law was enacted for teachers (OR laws Ch. 390).48
Subjects of meet and confer were limited to matters of salary and related economic
policies affecting professional services. Local school boards were empowered to
establish procedures for election and certification of teacher meet and confer
committees. Also during the 1965 legislative session, the Oregon State Employee's
47 Or. Laws ch. 579 (1963).
48 1965 ORS Ch. (390).
38
Association (OSEA) was successful in obtaining an amendment to the 1963 statute.49
The amendment required civil service commissions at all levels to establish and
administer procedures by which to designate bargaining units and select and certify
bargaining representatives as well as enact enforceable procedures governing
misconduct of representation elections. This 1965 statute implied that bargaining was
mandated in state and in all county governments which were required to have a civil
service commission. In 1966, for the first time, the state and the labor organizations
which represented its employees signed collective bargaining agreements. In
1969 the State Civil Service Commission was abolished and personnel management for
state service became centralized in the Personnel Division of the Executive
Department. The Civil Service Commission was renamed the Public Employee
Relations Board (PERB) and given the dual responsibilities of performing the
functions of the former Civil Service Commission as well as administering the
collective bargaining law for the State and local government units that chose to be
covered by state law procedures. The 1969 law also transferred the State Conciliation
Service from the Bureau of Labor to the PERB. Among the changes made by the 1969
legislative session was a broadened definition of the term employment relations and a
new definition of collective bargaining adapted from language contained in the Taft-
Hartley Act, both of which would have made it difficult for local governments to
argue the non-mandatory nature of the statute.50 One other amendment, however,
49 Or. Laws ch. 543.
50 Oregon Law Review, y 21, 1971, p. 14.
39
lessened the apparent mandatory impact of the law. The term "public employer,"
which previously included the state as well as "a county or city, or any political
subdivision thereof'S) was amended by the addition of the qualifying phrase "that has
requested the Public Employee Relations Board under ORS 243.751 to make its
services and facilities available for the purpose of establishing public employee
representation."
The 1971 legislature amended the meet and confer law for public teachers to
require consultation over "salaries and related economic issues and grievance
procedures," while at the same time placing classified employees of school districts
under a similar meet and confer law.s2 Also by 1971, there were a number of local
governments bargaining, as well as a number refusing to bargain, with labor
organizations. In June 1971, Jim Redden, who had ben appointed to the PERB in
1969, suggested to Governor Tom McCall that a task force be appointed to study the
matter of public sector collective bargaining and submit proposed legislation on the
matter to the 1973 legislature. The task force proposed an extensive amendment to the
existing state collective bargaining law. Although opposed by a group of senate
members who attempted a petition to place the mater before the voters of the state, the
PECBA became effective October 5, 1973.53 Within two months, over 200
51 Or Laws ch. 579.002 (4) (1963).
52 1971 Or Laws ch 582.
53 Or laws ch 536.
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representation petitions and unfair labor practice complaints were filed. 54 The Public
Employee Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA) grants to public employees the right to
join labor organizations and to negotiate collective bargaining agreements. The main
features of the PECBA are as follows: 1. Employees have the right to exclusive
representation by a certified or recognized labor organization. 2. Parties in a collective
bargaining relationship can demand that sub}ects referred to as employment relations
be the focus of negotiation. The term employment relations includes but is not limited
to matters of direct or indirect monetary benefits, hours, vacation, sick leave, grievance
procedures, and other conditions of employment. 3. The PECBA collective bargaining
process provides for dispute resolution mechanisms which include negotiation,
mediation, fact finding, arbitration, and a cooling off period. 4. The PECBA prohibits
discrimination against employees for forming, joining, or participating in the activities
of a labor organization of their choice. 5. The Employment Relations Board (ERB)
enforces the PECBA through orders executed in unfair labor practice complaint
hearings.55
It has been 20 years since the Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act
became law. The purpose of the present study is to determine what the impact of that
legislation has been on the civil service merit system and public personnel
administration in the State of Oregon generally.
54 Greer, William, Jr. (Ed.), Labor and Employment Law: Public Sector (Oregon CLE
1990), pp. 1-10.
55 Greer, William, JI. (Ed.), Labor and Employment Law: Public Sector (Oregon CLE
1990), pp. 1-2.
41
METHOD
SUBJECTS
The observation units in this study are labor relations specialists, personnel
directors, or other persons designated by person...iel directors to complete the survey
instrument. The units of analysis are the counties and cities of Oregon. Surveys were
sent to all 36 counties, all cities with populations greater than 20,000, and a
representative sample of 25% of all Oregon cities with a population of between 500
and 20,000. In organizations where the personnel staff included both a personnel
manager and labor relations specialist, surveys were sent to both parties. Including
those sent to personnel managers and labor relations specialists, a total of 42 county
surveys were mailed. Surveys were sent to 56 Oregon cities. One difference between
the respondents in the two sampling frames is that a large proportion of city
organizational structures do not have a position solely dedicated to personnel
management. (Fully one half of the cities in Oregon have populations under 1,000,
and 62% of the cities that returned surveys indicated a work force of 37 or fewer
employees). Therefore, the personnel management function is often handled by a city
manager, commissioner, recorder, or mayor rather than a professional personnel
administrator. In these cases, an effort was made to determine who, within the
structure of that particular organization, had the greatest knowledge of or responsibility
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for personnel administration. Although the civil seIVice merit system has applicability
to all public employers, a decision was made to include only counties and cities and to
exclude other public employers such as school districts, water districts, and other
special districts. The rationale for this exclusion was based on the size of the
employing unit, as was the decision to exclude cities with populations under 500 as
explained below. The purpose of this study was to solicit information concerning the
impact of collective bargaining on the civil seIVice/merit system from the perspective
of the public employer and, for that reason, labor organizations were not included as
respondents to the SUIVey.
MATERIALS
The materials used in this study were the Oregon revised statutes (ORS) covering
merit system and collective bargaining law (ORS chapters 240, 241, 242, and 243),
Employment Relations Board (ERB) orders, and court decisions re'lating to those
statutes. In addition, a written SUIVey instrument was administered by mail. There
were two versions of the sUIVey instrument used, differing only in the wording with
respect to the terms "county" and "city." A copy of each of the SUIVey instruments is
included in appendix A of this report.
DESIGN
This research utilized a multiple methods design. The data collection
methodology of this study involved two approaches. The first was a document review
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of st'!te statutes, administrative rules, Employment Relations Board orders, and court
decisions applicable to the civil service and collective bargaining. The second
approach to data collection employed a written survey designed to solicit the opinion
of personnel administrators and others in a position to have an opinion concerning the
influence of collective bargaining on the civil service/merit system within their
respective jurisdictions.
The survey instrument was designed to solicit information in four areas. The first
16 questions requested descriptive information such as the number of employees and
whether or not the city or county engaged in collective bargaining. Question 17 was
designed to determine the extent to which procedures governing certain personnel
functions were established by either collective bargaining agreement or civil
service/merit system rules. Question 18 was of a more subjective nature. This item
asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they feel the civil service merit
system and collective bargaining are in conflict with regard to the areas of personnel
administration listed in question 17. Questions 19 and 20 were open-ended response
items which asked what the effect of public sector collective bargaining has been and
specifically what changes have been made as a result of union discussions in their
jurisdictions. To the extent that question 18 asked for a response indicating a feeling
of conflict, the answers necessarily reflect personnel manager's perceptions of conflict
rather than its existence on an objective scale. No attempt was made to operationally
defme the term conflict, and no claim is made that this rating indicates any objective
measurement of the existence of conflict nor that this perceived level of conflict
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indicated by individual managers would be universally recognized by all members of
the organization. The purpose of the question is solely to identify personnel managers'
perceptions of the existence of conflict between the two systems.
Both qualitative and quantitative methods of data analysis were employed to
interpret the data. Qualitative analysis of historical documents yielded descriptive
information pertaining to such factors as the proliferation of collective bargaining
legislation and the rationale behind such legislation. Quantitative survey data were
analyzed using simple techniques of basic descriptive statistics and tabulation. No
difference tests or other inferential statistics were employed in the analysis of the data
due to the low statistical power inherent in such a small sample (e.g., only 17 counties
and 10 cities report the presence of both civil service and collective bargaining). In
addition to the quantitative analysis, narrative survey data were analyzed using content
analysis techniques, which were applied to the open-ended survey responses and
interview data. A combination of quantitative and qualitative techniques were used in
tandem with the expectation that such an approach would contribute to a more
thorough investigation of the research question and lead to a better understanding of
the impact which collective bargaining legislation may have had on the civil service
merit system than would the use of either technique alone.
PROCEDURE
As a first step in the construction of the survey instrument, as well as a later
check on its face validity, a non-random sample of individuals who are in a position to
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have firsthand knowledge of public sector labor relations issues (key informers) were
interviewed in person or by telephone to aid in the identification of potential issues
related to the effects of collective bargaining on the merit system.56 Following these
interviews, a written survey of 20 questions was developed. After the survey
instrument was constructed, it was "piloted" on a non-random sample of five
respondents. The objective of this pilot study was to discover and correct any potential
for respondents to misinterpret the questions as they were worded. No changes to the
survey were made as a result of the pilot study returns.
In order to compile the sample used in this study, a list of all Oregon counties
and cities was drawn from the most recent (1990) U.S. Census data and two sampling
frames, county and city, were developed from that list.
The county sampling frame consisted of a list of all 36 Oregon counties. Prior to
mailing the survey instrument, telephone calls were made to personnel directors and
labor relations specialists in order to discuss the purpose of the research and ask for
their commitment to complete the survey. Of 49 potential respondents, eleven were
unavailable by telephone and did not return phone calls. In one case the Personnel
Manager was unable to return toll calls apparently due to the budget restrictions that
ballot measure five had imposed on the county. Surveys were then mailed to personnel
directors and labor relations specialists of the selected jurisdictions accompanied by a
56 These persons include personnel representatives of one major city, one major
county, and a senior assistant attorney general who represents the state of Oregon in
labor relations matters and whose chapter on public sector labor relations appears in
Greer.
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cover letter explaining the purpose of the study. A self-addressed postage paid
envelope was included for return of the survey. Approximately three weeks after the
initial mailing, follow-up calls were made to any respondents who by that time had not
returned the survey. A second follow-up call was made after five weeks and, in some
cases, a third call was made after eight weeks. Any surveys not returned after three
follow-up calls were considered uncollectible data and were not included in the
analysis.
There are a total of 241 cities in Oregon. The city sampling frame consisted of
all 186 Oregon cities with a population over 500. A sample of 56 Oregon cities was
drawn from this frame in the following manner. As a first step, the 14 Oregon cities
with populations greater than 20,000 were chosen for inclusion in the sample. The
systematic inclusion of larger cities in the sample was deemed appropriate for two
reasons. First, excluding them would have resulted in substantial under representation
of cities housing the majority of citizens and local government employees in the state.
Second, smaller cities are assumed less likely to have both civil service merit and
collective bargaining systems. Since one purpose of this study was to assess the degree
of conflict existing under the presence of both systems, it was deemed necessary to
insure that cities likely to have both systems would be included in the final sample.
Next, the list of 172 remaining cities was sorted by population and, using a periodic
sampling technique with a random start, every fourth city was selected. Forty two
cities were selected in this manner for inclusion in the study. As with the county
sampling frame, preliminary phone calls to survey respondents were made in an effort
to maximize the response rate. The final sample used in this study consisted of 98
individuals and 92 organizations, 56 city and 36 county governments.
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RESULTS
REVIEW OF CURRENT STATUTES
One means of determining the impact of collective bargaining on the civil service
merit system is to examine the relevant legislation governing each of the two systems.
This was the approach taken by Douglas in his 1992 article. Douglas took the initial
position that the power of civil service merit systems had been usurped by collective
bargauling legislation. He reviewed the scope of bargaining limits, statute revocation,
and primacy of legislation procedures of statewide public sector labor relations laws in
those states which had enacted public sector labor relations statutes through 1990.
Douglas contended that if civil service merit systems are statutorily protected, either
by direct reference (i.e. by statutory language specifically protecting the merit system)
or by limits placed on the scope of bargaining, then it may be argued that the
perception of a diminished status of merit systems is false. If, on the other hand,
legislation subjugates Civil Service Merit Systems to collective bargaining, then it can
be argued that Civil Service Merit Systems have acquired a diminished status.57 Based
on a reading of the current Oregon statutes governing civil service merit systems and
public sector collective bargaining, it is clear that the intent of policy makers in
57 Douglas, Joel, M. "State Civil Service and Collective Bargaining: Systems in
Conflict," Public Administration Review, vol. 52 (2), March/April 1992, p. 162.
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drafting those laws was to give supremacy to collective bargaining over civil service
authority as a means of determining the wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment of bargaining unit employees in the public sector.
DRS 240
Following the reasoning set out by Douglas, examination of the statutory
language of merit system and collective bargaining legislation in Oregon suggests that
it was the intent of the legislature to establish the dominance of collective bargaining
agreements over civil service merit system rules in at least some, if not all, aspects of
the employer employee relationship. Specifically,DRS 240.321(2) gives precedence to
collective bargaining agreements in the determination of all aspects of wages, hours,
and other terms of employment for employees of state agencies who are in certified or
recognized appropriate bargaining units.
Sections (2) and (3) of ORS 240.321 state:
(2) Notwithstanding any of the provisions of DRS 240.235, 240.306, 240.316,
240.430, and 240.551, employees of state agencies who are in certified or
recognized appropriate bargaining units shall have all aspects of their wages,
hours, and other terms ofemployment determined by collective bargaining
agreements between the state and its agencies and the exclusive employee
representatives of such employees pursuant to the provision of DRS 243.640 to
243.762 except with regard to applicants for initial appointment to state service.
(3) The provisions of rules adopted by the division, the subjects of which are
incorporated into collective bargaining agreements, shall not be applicable to
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employees within appropriate bargaining units covered by such agreements
(emphasis added).
ORS 240.321(2) applies only to employees of the State of Oregon, not to all public
employees in the state. DRS 240.321 is specifically to give precedence to collective
bargaining agreements in the determination of all aspects of wages, hours, and other
terms of employment for employees of state agencies who are in certified or
recognized appropriate bargaining units pursuant to the provision of ORS 243.640 to
243.762. There is no parallel language in DRS 241 or ORS 242 which subjugates the
merit system in county or local governments to collective bargaining. Therefore, the
supremacy of the PECBA over other statutes dealing with labor relations issues must
be determined by comparing each of them to the PECBA. However, a reading of The
Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (ORS 243.650 to 243.782) in conjunction
with ERB orders and court rulings makes it clear that it was the intent of the
legislature, in enacting ch. 243, that collective bargaining be given precedence over the
civil service merit system as well as other state statutes and local ordinances governing
employment relations at all levels of government.
DRS 243
DRS 243.650 to 243.782 is known as The Public Employee Collective
Bargaining Act (PECBA). This act grants public employees the right to be represented
by labor organizations and to negotiate collective bargaining agreements (emphasis
added). The principal features of the PECBA are as follows:
1. Employees have the right to exclusive representation by a certified or
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recognized labor organization. 2. Parties in a collective bargaining relationship
can demand that subjects referred to as employment relations be the focus of
negotiation. The term employment relations includes but is not limited to matters
of direct or indirect monetary benefits, hours, vacation, sick leave, grievance
procedures and other conditions of employment. 3. The PECBA collective
bargaining process provides for dispute resolution mechanisms which include
negotiation, mediation, fact finding, arbitration, and a cooling off period. 4. TIle
PECBA prohibits discrimination against employees for forming, joining, or
participating in the activities of a labor organization of their choice. 5. The
Employment Relations Board (ERB) enforces the PECBA through orders
executed in unfair labor practice complaint hearings.58
The purpose of ORS 243.650 to 243.782, as specifically set out in ORS 243.656 (5), is
to obligate public employers, public employees and their representatives to enter
into collective negotiations with willingness to resolve grievances and disputes
relating to employment relations and to enter into written and signed contracts
evidencing agreements resulting from such negotiations. It is also the purpose of
ORS 243.650 to 243.782 to promote the improvement of employer-employee
relations within the various public employers by providing a uniform basis for
recognizing the right of public employees to join organizations of their own
choice, and to be represented by such organizations in their employment relations
58 Greer, William, Jr. (Ed.), Labor and Employment Law: Public Sector (Oregon CLE
1990), p. 1-2.
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with public employers.59
Public employer is defined by the act as
The State of Oregon or any political subdivision therein, including cities,
counties, community colleges, school districts, special districts, and public and
quasi-public corporations. "Public employer" includes any individual designated
by the public employer to act in its interests in dealing with public employees.60
Public employee is defined as "an employee of a public employer but does not include
elected officials, persons appointed to serve on boards or commissions, or persons who
are confidential employees. ,,61 A confidential employee is one "who assists and acts in
a confidential capacity to a person who formulates, determines and effectuates
management policies in the area of collective bargaining. ,,62 Labor organizations as
defined in DRS 243 means "any organization which has as one of its purposes
representing employees in their employment relations with public employers. ,,63
Collective bargaining is defined as
the performance of the mutual obligation of a public employer and the
representative of its employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to employment relations, or the negotiation of an agreement, or
59 DRS 243.656(5).
60 DRS 243.650(18).
61 ORS 243.650(17).
62 DRS 243.650(6).
63 DRS 243.650(12).
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any question arising there-under, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. However, this
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the
making of a concession.64
Section .656 of ORS chapter 243 is a policy statement which reads:
(1) The people of this state have a fundamental interest in the development of
harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its employees;
(2) Recognition by public employers of the right of public employees to organize
and full acceptance of the principle and procedure of collective negotiation
between public employers and public employee organizations can alleviate
various forms of strife and unrest. Experience in the private and public sectors of
our economy has proved that unresolved disputes in the public service are
injurious to the public, the governmental agencies, and public employees; (3)
Experience in private and public employment has also proved that protection by
law of the right of employees to organize and negotiate collectively safeguards
employees and the public from injury, impairment, and interruptions of necessary
services, and removes certain recognized sources of strife and unrest, by peaceful
adjustment of disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, terms and
other working conditions, and by establishing greater equality of bargaining
power between public employers and public employees; (4) The state has a basic
obligation to protect the public by attempting to assure the orderly and
64 ORS 243.650(8).
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uninterrupted operations and :functions of government; and (5) It is the purpose of
ORS 243.650 to 243.782 to obligate public employers, public employees, and
their representatives to enter into collective negotiations with willingness to
res:olve grievances and disputes relating to employment relations and to enter into
written and signed contracts evidencing agreements resulting from such
negotiations. It is also the purpose of ORS 243.650 to 243.782 to promote the
improvement of employer employee relations within the various public employers
by providing a uniform basis for recognizing the right of public employees to
join organizations of their own choice, and to be represented by su~h
organizations in their employment relations with public employers.
The definitions elucidated in ORS ch. 243.650 coupled with the policy statement
of se"tion 243.656 clearly indicate that the intent of the legislature in Oregon is to
give preference to collective bargaining over civil service authority as a means of
resolving disputes relating to employment relations and in determining the wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment of public employees who are
members of a bargaining unit.
Given that the legislative intent is to obligate public employers, public
employees, and their representatives to enter into collective negotiations to resolve
grievances and disputes relating to employment relations, the question of impact is
twofold: I) How have county and local governments responded to the mandate that
they engage in collective bargaining; and 2) What specific personnel :functions have
come to be established and/or guided by collective bargaining agreements? To begin
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to answer these questions we tum to a discussion of Employment Relations Board
orders and court rulings.
RELATIONSlllP OF THE PECBA TO OTHER STATUTES
Since its enactment in 1973, ERB and state court system have had to face issues
concerning the relationship between the PECBA and the provisions of other state
statutes and local ordinances governing public employees. One such issue concerned
the concept of home rule. A second, yet related, issue is that of what constitutes a
public employer. The third issue is that of scope of bargaining. Cases relating to all
three issues will be discussed in the following section.
The Issue of Home Rule
The Oregon constitution prohibits the state legislature from enacting, amending,
or repealing any charter or act of incorporation for any municipality, city, or town.65
Similar language protects the charters of counties in the State.66 The issue of home
rule is relevant to the present discussion because the home rule principle was cited by
four cities and one county as authority for not conforming to ORS chapter 242.
In State ex reI Heinig v. Milwaukie, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that the
city of Milwaukie need not follow the state civil service statutes since civil service for
fire fighters was a matter of primarily local concern.67 The Heinig decision thus
65 Oregon Constitution article XI section 2.
66 Oregon Constitution article VI section 10.
67 231 Or 473, 483-484, 373 P2d 680 (1962).
56
invalidated that portion of ORS 242 which would have required Milwaukie (and all
Oregon cities) to establish a civil service system for firemen on the grounds that such
matters were of "local concern." However, the Oregon Attorney General, in a 1967
opinion, reasoned that Heinig did not preclude the legislature from requiring home rule
cities to bargain with their employees.68 Subsequent cases, while not over-ruling
Heinig, have limited the power of local governments in related areas. For instance, in
La Grande/Astoria v. PERB69 it was found that retirement benefits for fire fighters was
a matter of state concern and therefore the Public Employee Retirement System does
not violate home rule amendments.70 The Oregon Supreme Court ultimately ruled, in
City of Roseburg v. Roseburg City Fire fighters, that PECBA does not violate the
home rule amendment of the Oregon Constitution. 71
The case of AFSCME Local 350 v. Clackamas County arose when the county
refused to bargain proposals, submitted by AFSCME, dealing with procedures for
layoff which eliminated or replaced procedures contained in the previous agreement
related to the Civil Service Commission and its rules. The county argued that, while it
was willing to discuss the proposals, it had no authority to agree to them unless the
proposals were accepted by a vote of the people. AFSCME filed an unfair labor
practice complaint charging Clackamas County with refusal to bargain certain
68 33 Op. Or. Attorney General 295 (1967).
69 La Grande/Astoria v. PERB, Or 173, 586 P2d 765 (1978).
70 Labor and Employment Law: Public Sector, (Oregon CLE 1990) p. 14-6.
71 City of Roseburg v. Roseburg City Fire fighters, 292 Or 266, 639 P2d 90 (1981).
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mandatory subjects. ERB found that the County had refused to bargain in good faith
over layoff, discipline, and grievance proposals in violation of ORS 243.672 (1) (a)
and (e).
The Board reasoned that, although there did appear to be a statutory conflict
between certain bargaining rights guaranteed by the PECBA and the authority granted
to the Civil Service Commission, legislative intent was clear that, where employees are
organized, matters of employment relations should be developed under and governed
by the PECBA. ERB ruled that because the PECBA was enacted after the Civil
Service statues, and because it included a statement of legislative intent to provide a
uniform basis for bargaining, the legislature intended "all employment relations of
organized public employees" to be governed by the PECBA rather than local Civil
Service commissions.72 The County appealed the ERB order, and the court of Appeals
ruled that proposals which involve order of layoff and recall, grievance procedures, or
arbitration procedures involve conditions of employment and are therefore mandatory
subjects of bargaining. The court also ruled that, since the union proposals were
mandatory subjects of bargaining subject to the PECBA, the County committed an
unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain them. The court acknowledged the
seeming conflict between ORS chapters 243 and 241 but noted that PECBA "is later
enacted and is more comprehensive. ,,73 Further, the procedures of PECBA are
72 AFSCME Local 350 v. Clackamas County, 7 PECBR (1983), affirmed 69 Or App
488 (1984).
73 AFSCME Local 350 v. Clackamas County, 7 PECBR (1983).
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mandated for all public employers, including counties, while chapter 241 simply
permits counties to adopt a civil seIVice system. Finally, the court found that a county
is neither required to have a civil seIVice system nor to submit a proposed civil seIVice
system to the voters but is required to bargain matters pertaining to employment
relations.
Who is the Public Employer
Three cases which have come before ERB and the courts are of particular
importance to this issue, the lead case being OSEA v. Lincoln County and Sheriff
Everett Hockema.74 In 1977, the Oregon State Employees Association filed a
complaint alleging that, through Lincoln County, Sheriff Hockema discharged three
deputy sheriffs who seIVed on the Association's bargaining team, along with the
President of the Association, because of their participation in the bargaining process in
violation ofORS 243.672 (1) (a) (b) (c) (e) and (i). These sections of the statute
define certain unfair labor practices on the part of an employer related to interference
with or discrimination against an employee because of their participation in any
employee organization. The issues before ERB were whether the deputy sheriffs of
Lincoln County were public employers under ORS 243.650 to 782, and if so, whether
or not the alleged acts constituted unfair labor practices within the meaning of ORS
243.672 (1) (a ) (b) (c) (e) and (i).
Sheriff Hockema argued that appointed deputy sheriffs seIVed at the pleasure of
74 OSEA v. Lincoln County and Sheriff Everett Hockema, 3 PECBA 1650 (1977), afl'd
49 Or App 349 (1980).
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the sheriff under ORS 204.635, and that because they were appointed deputies, as
sheriff he had absolute authority to fire them at will. Hockema also argued that any
attempt at limitation of the sheriff's ability to terminate these deputies by application
of the PECBA was in conflict with ORS 204.635, and that because of the terms of
204.635, bargaining on the issue of termination was not required. ORS 204.635 states
in part:
(1) A sheriff's deputies shall be appointed by him in writing and continue during
his pleasure .... (3) A deputy has the power to perform any act or duty that his
principal has, and a person specifically appointed to do a particular act
authorized. The principal is responsible for the conduct of such deputy or person
specially appointed except as provided in subsection (4) of this section ....
ERB found that Sheriff Hockema's actions had violated all of the above sections of
ORS 243. ERB also rejected the Sheriff's argument that any attempt to limit his
authority to terminate employees at will was inconsistent with ORS 204.635. ERB
ruled that, in applying rules of statutory construction, it is clear that the protection
afforded public employees, including deputy sheriffs, by the PECBA is not abrogated
by ORS 204.635. ERB stated, "To the extent a conflict exists between the PECBA
which was enacted in 1973 and ORS 204.635 which descends without change from
Deady's Code of Laws of 1959, section 962, the PECBA must take precedence."75
ERB's ruling was appealed and the Appellate Court affirmed the decision of
ERR. Reconsideration was denied, as was a petition for review. The court held that,
75 ORS 174.020.
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since a public employer, the state, within the meaning of ORS 243 has designated
sheriffs to act in its interests in dealing with deputies, the sheriff is a public employer
under the law and his deputies are public employees.
The other two cases worthy of mention with respect to the supremacy of the
PECBA over other statutes dealing with labor relations are Lent v. Employment
Relations Board of the State of Oregon,76 and Circuit Court of Oregon, Fifteenth
Judicial District, Juvenile Judge, Honorable Richard L. Baron et at v. AFSCME Local
502-a.77
Judge Lent was the Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme . He argued that labor
relations with employees of the judicial department were not subject to the PECBA
because his authority under ORS 1.002 and 1.008 was inconsistent with and should
prevail over the provisions of the PECBA. Th~ provisions of ORS 1.002 and 1.008
were enacted by OR Laws 1981, sometimes referred to as the Reform Act of 1981,
and state:
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall establish and maintain, consistent
with applicable provisions of law: (1) A personnel plan for officers, other than
judges, and employees of the courts of this state who are state officers or
employees, governing the appointment, promotion, classification, minimum
qualifications, compensation, expenses, leave, transfer, removal, discipline and
other incidents of employment of those qualified officers.
76 63 Or App 400 (1983).
77 295 Or 542 (1983).
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The trial court found that the exercise of personnel functions delegated by the court
Reform Act of 1981 are subject to the PECBA, and that there is no unconstitutional
infringement on the judiciary by either the legislature or the executive branch. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling, and a petition for review was denied.
In the Barron case, Judge Barron argued that since he had authority to hire, fire,
and set salaries of juvenile court counselors under ORS 419.604, he was not bound by
PECBA. ERB had entered an order requiring juvenile justice court judges to bargain
with the juvenile counselors' union, and Judge Barron appealed the order. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the order and the judge again appealed.78 The Supreme court
affirmed the decision of the appeals court fmding that
( 1) There is nothing in language of statute authorizing judge to hire, fire, and set
salaries of counsellors that made it inconsistent with simultaneous operation of
Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act, and (2) inclusion of juvenile court
judges and counselors in Act did not conflict with Oregon Constitution sections
governing separation of powers or section governing COurtS.79
There is one final case on the relationship of the PECBA to other statutes dealing
with labor relations which has application to the present study. This case addresses
the specific question of whether the PECBA is superordinate to ORS 240. AFSCME
Locals 2623-A 2623-B and 191-B v. Executive Department et a1.80 was a consolidated
78 61 Or App 311, 657 P2d 1237.
79 295 Or 542 (1983).
80 52 Or App 457 (1981).
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case dealing with several issues; however, in its relation to the present study, the
central issue was whether the legislature, in enacting the PECBA, meant to remove
from the State Personnel Division the authority to set salaries for individual employees
in collective bargaining units as outlined in DRS ch. 240. In January 1979, the state
and union began the process of negotiating a successor central agreement to a contract
due to expire on July first of that year. An impasse was reached with respect to
certain wage and benefit matters. Mediation failed. Fact finding was initiated and
completed. In June the union notified ERB that it did not accept the fact finder's
recommendations and requested interest arbitration pursuant to PECBA. The interest
arbitrator awarded salary increases which the state refused to implement. AFSCME
filed an unfair labor practice complaint alleging that the state had violated the
provisions of DRS 243.742 and 243.752. ERB found that the state had committed an
Wlfair labor practice by refusing to implement the arbitrator's award and directed the
state to comply. The state did not comply with ERB's order, and in June of 1980 both
parties filed for judicial review. AFSCME's position was that the PECBA (at that time
the Public Employee Relations Act, PERA) required compulsory interest arbitration in
the case of impasse for those employees prohibited by law from striking. Among other
things, the state argued that ERB erred in affirming the arbitration award without the
approval of the plan by the Personnel division in accordance with ORS 240.215,
240.233, 240.235, and 240.240. With regard to the issue of binding arbitration and the
conflict between DRS 240 and 243 the court found that
while the State Personnel Division retains the power to group all job positions
63
into classes and to adopt, pursuant to ORS 240.235 (1) for each class or position,
a salary range which includes maximum, minimum, and intermediate positions,
that: (1) the establishment of the compensation plan itself can be a subject for
bargaining between the state and labor organizations and (2) the individual wage
rates for public employees in collective bargaining units are to be set within the
negotiated ranges. Where the bargaining process breaks down, and the
employees are forbidden by law from striking, the arbitrator has been given the
authority to set new salaries for those employees. The Personnel Division does
not have the authority to approve these rates. We conclude that this was the
intention of the legislature in enacting ORS 243.696 and ORS 243.742.
The above cases have demonstrated that ERB and the courts view the PECBA as
superordinate to other state statutes and local ordinances which also deal with matters
of employment relations. On the matter of home rule ERB ruled that, because the
PECBA was enacted after the Civil SelVice statues, and because it included a
statement of legislative intent to provide a uniform basis for bargaining, the legislature
intended all employment relations of organized public employees to be governed by
the PECBA rather than local Civil SelVice commissions. As concerns the issue of
whether matters of labor relations between public employers and public employees are
subject to the provisions of the PECBA or other state statutes, ERB and the courts
have consistently ruled that, although there may appear to be a conflict between two
statutes, such matters are subject to the provisions of the PECBA. In Hockema, the
court reasoned that the PECBA takes precedence because of its more recent enactment.
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In Lent and Barron, the court reasoned that, there was no conflict between the PECBA
and the provisions of the other statutes cited in challenge to the authority of the
PECBA. In AFSCME Locals 2623-A 2623-B and 191-B v. Executive Department et
al. the court ruled that, while the State Personnel Division retains the power to group
all job positions into classes and to adopt salary ranges which include maximum,
minimum, and intermediate positions, the establishment of the compensation plan itself
can be a subject for bargaining between the state and labor organizations.
Previous literature has speculated on the question of which areas of personnel
administration are likely to be affected by collective bargaining legislation, while the
preceding discussion of state statutes, local ordinances, ERB orders, and court
decisions have demonstrated the intent of the Oregon legislature and the courts with
respect to the superordinate relationship of the PECBA to other pieces of legislation
governing public sector labor relations. The third major issue which ERB and state
court system have had to face with regard to the implementation of the PECBA
concerns the scope of bargaining. Once it is determined that an entity is a public
employer and that the public employer must bargain, on what topics must that public
employer enter into negotiations when it is requested by the other party?
The Issue of Scope of Bargaining
A brief summary of Employment Relations Board findings and court decisions
will provide an answer to the question of what the scope of bargaining has come to be
under the def.nition of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.
Following the federal practice, bargaining items in Oregon are classified into
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three categories. Mandatory subjects are topics which parties are legally obligated to
bargain (although they are not legally obligated to reach an agreement). Permissive
subjects are those which parties may bargain by mutual agreement. Prohibited subjects
are those which are not bargainable generally because to do so would contradict
existing state law. In general terms, the scope of bargaining issue is important for four
reasons.8l First, while it is legal to propose a permissive subject, it is an unfair labor
practice to insist on negotiation of a permissible subject to the point of impasse.
Second, a determination is important because only mandatory items may precede to
fact finding (unless the other party has failed to identify the issue as permissive in
earlier stages of bargaining). Third, permissive subjects may not be included as strike
issues. However, if the employer has not refused to bargain an item on the grounds
that it is permissive, the item may be a strike item. Finally, an employer may not take
unilateral action on a permissive item.
The scope of bargaining issue is relevant to this study because, to the extent that
a subject is mandatory, it is not subject to civil service/merit system control. It may be
argued that permissive topics are subject to neither collective bargaining nor civil
service rules but are management rights issues. However, we would argue that, to the
extent permissive subjects actually are bargained, the collective bargaining model has
gained dominance in the overall administration of public sector personnel practice.
The statutory language of ORS 243.656 (3) makes it clear that items with financial
impact to employees (disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, terms, and
81 Hungerford & Bischof, Oregon Labor Law Today, pp. 2.4.1-2.4.2.
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other working conditions) are mandatory subjects of bargaining. What is meant by the
terms "wages" and "hours" seldom is at question or a matter of dispute. In addition,
certain other specific items which are mandatory subjects of bargaining are defined
elsewhere in the statutes; these include vacation time, sick leave, and grievance
procedures as outlined in ORS 243.650 (7).
Most scope of bargaining issues arise from interpretation of the term "other
working conditions" mentioned in ORS 243.656 (3). In Oregon, the determination of
whether items covered under the term "other working conditions" are permissive,
mandatory, or prohibited is initially made by Employment Relations Board. ERB has
seldom determined a bargaining proposal to be prohibited. The best known and most
far reaching of the cases concerned with scope of bargaining was Springfield
Education Association v. Springfield School District.82 The Springfield Education
Association had filed an unfair labor practice complaint against the Springfield School
District over the district's refusal to bargain 92 specified items on the grounds that
they were non-mandatory subjects of bargaining.83 One particular issue in that case
was whether teacher evaluations were subjects of bargaining. In Springfield, after
rejecting various tests suggested by each party, ERB developed criteria which defined
prohibited subjects as items "which would require either party to do an illegal act or
82 Springfield Education Association v. Springfield School District,l PECBR 347
(1975), 22 Or App 751, 547 P2d 647, former opinion modified 25 Or App 407, 549
P2d 1141, rev. denied 276 Or 387(1976), on remand 3 PECBR 1950, 1969 (1978), 42
Or App 93, 600 P2d 425 (1979), aff'd 290 Or 217, 621 P2d 547 (1980).
83 Kaser, Stephen, "The Scope of Bargaining Under Oregon's Public Employee
Collective Bargaining Act," Oregon Law Review, Y 56, 1977, p. 439.
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perform an act which is contrary to any other statutory or constitutional provision."84
ERB ruled that because it was covered by statute, and because it was a management
prerogative, the subject of teacher evaluations was a permissive subject of bargaining.
On appeal, the court ruled that ERB should have applied the balancing test which was
first articulated by the court of appeals in Sutherlin Education association v. Sutherlin
School District85 as follows:
The appropriate test to be applied in determining whether a proposed subject is a
"condition of employment" and therefore a mandatory subject for bargaining is to
balance the element of educational policy involved against the effect that the
subject has on a teacher's employment.86
In 1977 ERB reheard the case and again found that the basis for and use of teacher
evaluations were permissive subjects of bargaining since educational policy interests
outweighed teacher interests.87 ERB also found that certain aspects of the evaluation
(the right to know the basis for the evaluation, right to notice of the evaluation report,
right to have the evaluation presented in written form, and right to respond) were
mandatory subjects because the effects on a teacher's conditions of employment
outweighed the educational policy considerations.88 On a second appeal, the court
84 Springfield, 1 PECBR 347 1975.
85 Sutherlin Education association v. Sutherlin School District, 25 Or App 85, 548 p2d
204 (1976).
86 25 Or App at 88.
87 Hungerford & Bischof, Oregon Labor Law Today, p. 2.4.4.
88 3 PECBR 1959 (1978).
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confirmed the right of ERB to define "other conditions of employment," finding that
the legislature had delegated the policy-making function to interpret statutory language
to ERB.89 The Oregon Supreme Court eventually heard the case and reversed the Court
of Appeals determination of ERB's policy-making role, finding that deciding the scope
of employment relations was a matter of interpretation rather than an addition of items
to be included under the term "other conditions of employment." The Supreme Court
did, however, back ERB's use of the balancing test. In 1983, ERB ruled that "where a
subject generally has a greater effect on working conditions than on management
rights, that subject is a condition of employment and is mandatory."90
Oregon's PECBA contains no management rights language per se, although
management rights clauses can be negotiated into individual bargaining agreements.
Any subject which is neither prohibited nor mandatory is a permissive subject of
bargaining in Oregon and, to the extent that a subject is either permissive or
mandatory, it is not solely within the scope of civil service/merit system rules. The
conclusion to be drawn is that the only topics outside the scope of bargaining are
those pertaining to the recruitment and selection of applicants for initial appointment.
As a result, collective bargaining can be said to have diminished the impact of the
civil service/merit system as a means of establishing procedures governing most public
personnel functions in Oregon. Based on a reading of the Oregon revifed statutes,
ERB opinions, and court decisions, we believe that the collective bargaining system
89 42 Or App 93 (1979).
90 IAFF v. City of Salem, 7 PECBR 5819, 5825 1983.
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has come to dominate public employee/employer relations in Oregon.
If it is the case that collective bargaining is now the dominant paradigm of public
employee personnel administration, what exactly has been the impact of the collective
bargaining system on the civil selVice merit system with respect to the day to day
administration of public sector personnel practice? The SUIVey employed in this study
was designed to provide insight into that issue.
SURVEY RESULTS
The following sections address the results of the sulVey, sent to al! Oregon
counties and approximately 25% of all Oregon cities, conducted as a part of this
research. Numerically scaled questions were designed to solicit personnel managers'
opinions as to the extent to which specific personnel functions are governed by civil
selVice merit systems or collective bargaining agreements. Similar questions were
intended to gauge the extent to which the civil selVice merit system and collective
bargaining are in conflict with regard to those same personnel functions. Open-ended
response items were designed to solicit managers' opinions as to the general effect
which collective bargaining may have had on the civil selVice merit system and the
specific ways in which union discussions, pressures, or influences may have caused
management to alter policies, procedures, or standards. Discussion will proceed with
presentation of the quantitative data followed by a presentation and discussion of
verbatim responses to open-ended SUIVey questions.
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County Descriptive Data
The county sample frame consisted of 36 counties and 42 individuals, including
personnel administrators and labor relations specialists. Of the 42 surveys that were
sent to Oregon counties, 39 surveys were returned for an individual response rate of
93%. These 39 returns included responses from 34 of 36 counties. The response rate
tallying counties, rather than individual respondents, as the unit of analysis was 94%.
This is an unusually high rate of return which is likely attributable to the technique of
placing preliminary and follow-up telephone calls to survey respondents. Because the
number of surveys returned by labor relations specialists was very small (n = 6), and
because surveys returned by personnel managers represented 34 of the 36 Oregon
counties, a decision was made not to include the labor relations specialists' survey data
in the analysis.
The mean population of Oregon's 36 counties, based on 1990 U.S. census data, is
89,394 with a median value of 46,300. Population values range from a low of 1,750 in
Gilliam County to a high of 605,000 in Multnomah County. Based on the 34 returned
surveys, the number of county employees ranges from a minimum of 11 in Morrow
County to 3,529 in Multnomah County, with a mean county work force of 503 and a
median of 280. The number of bargaining unit members also shows a large range,
from 7 in Crook County to 3,302 in Multnomah County. The mean number of
bargaining unit employees is 342, with a median of 154. The number of bargaining
agreements ranges from 1 in Gilliam County to 9 in Multnomah County. The mean
number of agreements is 3 and the median number of agreements is 2.5.
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Of the 34 responding counties, 17 (50%) reported that they have a merit system.
Four counties (11%) reported that they have a civil service system and civil service
board (Washington, Multnomah, Wasco, and Columbia). By statute, a county with a
civil service system must have a civil service board to administer that system. Because
the Oregon statutes do not make a distinction between civil service and merit systems,
the survey asked respondents if they had each type of system in place. Two counties
(Multnomah and Washington) reported the presence of both merit and civil service
systems. Thirty-three counties (97%) reported that they engage in collective bargaining
(only Sherman County does not), and 17 counties (50%) reported the presence of both
collective bargaining and merit systems. Of the four counties which have civil service
boards, three boards (Washington, Multnomah, and Wasco) reported that they meet "as
needed" and one (Columbia County) reported that they meet quarterly. All four of the
counties which have a civil service and a civil service board (Washington, Multnomah,
Columbia and Wasco) also responded that they engage in collective bargaining. This
information is summarized in Table 1 on page 77.
City Descriptive Data
Of the 56 surveys that were sent to Oregon cities, 34 surveys were returned for a
response rate of 61 %. Population values of those cities included in the sample ranged
from a low of 527 to a high of 37,319 based on 1990 U.S. census data. The mean
population of cities included in this study is 29,304 with a median value of 3,268.
Based on the 34 returned surveys, the number of city employees ranges from a low of
3 in Dufer to a high of 5,915 in Portland with a mean of 322 and a median of 22. The
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number of bargaining unit members ranges from 5 in Madras to 4,629 in Portland. The
mean number of bargaining unit members is 437 and the median is 108. The number
of bargaining agreements ranges from 1 in Eagle Point and Madras to 7 in Portland.
The mean and median number of agreements is 3.
Of the 34 responding cities, 15 (44%) report that they have a merit system. Four
(12%) report the presence of a civil service system. Twenty (59%) report that they
engage in collective bargaining, and ten cities (29%) report that they have both civil
service and collective bargaining systems. Of the four cities which have civil service
boards, two boards (Portland and Salem) meet monthly, one (Milwaukee) meets
annually, and the last (Bend) meets "infrequently." This information is summarized
along with that for the counties, in Table I on page 77.
Comparison of County and City Data
Surveys were sent to 36 counties and 56 cities. A total of 68 surveys (34 counties and
34 cities) were returned for an overall response rate of 74%. Counties were somewhat
more likely to report the presence of a merit system than are cities (50% of counties
versus 44% of cities), although the results of chi-square analysis showed a non-
significant difference between type of organization and presence or absence of a merit
system, X2 (1, N = 68) = 14.46,12>.7.
Counties, however, are significantly more likely to report that they engage in
collective bargaining than are cities (97% of counties versus 59% of cities), X2 (I, N =
68) = .139, 12 <.001. Given the data available in the present study, the reason for this
finding is difficult to ascertain and beyond is beyond the scope of this inquiry. One
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possibility is that the difference in the presence or absence of collective bargaining is
due to the number of employees. Post hoc analysis does show a statistically
significant zero order correlation between the presence of collective bargaining and
both of the variables, number of employees, r = .248, ~ = .042 and size of population,
r = .285, ~ = .018. However, there is an even greater zero order correlation between
type of governmental organization (city or county) and presence or absence of
collective bargaining r = -.46] 1, ~ < .001). To attribute the presence or absence of
collective bargaining simply to the presence of a large number of employees would be
overly simplistic and overlook such other variables as number and size of departments,
salary ranges and their relationship to local cost of living, and many other potential
influences effecting the presence or absence of collective bargaining.
As to the presence of dual personnel systems, 17 counties (50%) and 10 cities
(29%) report the presence of both civil service/merit and collective bargaining systems.
It would be interesting to more closely examine the relationship between the presence
or absence of duel personnel systems and such variables as type of organization (city
or county), number of employees and other factors, but again, the small number of
governmental units and thus low statistical power precludes a quantitative analysis of
this question.
Assessment of Influence
At this point it would be helpful to reiterate the distinction between a civil service or
merit system and the merit principle. A merit system is a set of established procedures,
such as personnel policies set out in a personnel manual or city/county ordinance,
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created to implement the principle of merit in government organizations. The goal of
the merit system, according to Helburn and Bennett, is to establish rules for the
movement of personnel into, within, and out of public employment,91 The merit
principh seeks to make relative employee competence the major criterion in decisions
directing the movement of personnel. David Stanley makes the following distinction
between a merit system and the merit principle.
The merit principle is the basis on which employees are recruited, selected, and
advanced under conditions of political neutrality, equal opportunity, and
competition on the basis of merit and competence. When we say merit systems,
however, this has come to mean a broad program of personnel activities. Some
are essential to carrying out the merit principle; recruiting, selecting, policing of
anti-politics and anti-discrimination rules and administering related appeals
provisions. Others are closely related and desirable: position classification, pay
administration, employee benefits, and training.92
One means of assessing the impact which collective bargaining has had on the
civil service merit system is simply to compare the number of governmental entities
which operate under one or another of the two systems. Of the 68 responding
governmental units, 32 (47%) reported the presence of a merit system. Nine
respondents (13%) reported the presence of a civil seIVice system (by definition for
91 Helburn, LB., and Bennett, 1972, "Public Employee Bargaining and the Merit
Principle", Labor Law Journal, 23, October, 618-629.
92 Stanley, David T., "What Are Unions Doing To The Merit System?" Public
Personnel Review, April 1970, p.109.
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counties this would be a merit system run by a civil service board). Fifty-three
governmental units (78%) reported that they engage in collective bargaining, and 27 of
68 survey respondents (40%) reported that they have both civil service and collective
bargaining systems. These results are presented in Table I found on page 77. A listing
of counties and cities, noting the presence or absence of each system is given in
Appendix B.
Clearly, collective bargaining has assumed a dominant position as a system of
personnel administration when dominance is defined as the frequency with which each
system is found. Furthermore, while 27 of the 32 units (84%) which report the
presence of a merit system also engage in collective bargaining, only 32 of the 53
units (60%) which engage in collective bargaining also report the presence of a merit
system. This apparent dominance of collective bargaining has led one administrator to
offer the observation that "we no longer administer civil service merit systems, we
administer a collective bargaining system. ,,93
A second means of determining the effect that collective bargaining has had on
the merit system is to compare the extent to which certain personnel fimctions are
governed either by collective bargaining agreements or merit system rules. Item 17 of
the survey conducted in conjunction with this study dealt with this question. At issue
is the range of personnel fimctions that is considered fundamental to the maintenance
of the merit system. As outlined in the Inter-governmental Personnel Act of 1970, the
following six dements are considered essential:
93 Personal commlUlication.
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I. recruitment; selection, and advancement of employees on the basis of relative
ability, knowledge, and skills, including open consideration of qualified applicants for
initial appointment; 2. equitable and adequate compensation; 3. training to insure
high quality performance; 4. correcting inadequate performance or separating those
whose inadequate performance cannot be corrected; 5. fair treatment of all employees
in all aspects of personnel administration without regard to political affiliation, race,
color, national origin, sex, or religion; 6. Protecting employees against partisan
political coercion.94
Table I
Prevalence of Civil Service, Merit. and
Collective Bargaining Systems
Personnel System All Counties Cities
Respondents
Merit System 32 (47%) 17 (50%) 15 (44%)
Civil Service 8 (13%) 4 (ll%) 4 (12%)
Collective Bargaining 53 (78%) 33 (97%) 20 (59%)
Collective Bargaining 27 (40%) 17 (50%) 10 (29%)
and Merit System
Note. Total sample N = 68, city n = 34, county n = 34.
94 Intergovernmental Personnel Act, Public Law 91-648.
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Discussion of responses to SUlVey item 17 is necessarily limited to those 27 responding
organizations that reported both that they have a merit system and that they engage in
collective bargaining. Once again, because of the small number of cities and counties
reporting the presence of both civil service merit and collective bargaining systems (}7
counties and 10 cities), only descriptive statistics and cross tabulations were employed
in the analysis of the data. Respondents were asked the following question: "To what
extent are procedures governing the following personnel functions for bargaining unit
employees in your jurisdiction established by collective bargaining agreements and/or
civil service merit system rules?" The functions included recruitment, selection,
promotion, classification, work assignment, transfer, reduction in force, training,
performance standards, dispute resolution, discipline, dismissal, appeal routes, salary,
pension/retirement, vacation leave, safety, sick leave, other leave, and "other personnel
functions." Respondents were asked to rate the relative influence of both systems on
the establishment of the above personnel functions, according to the following
instruction.
Please circle the number corresponding to the extent to which procedures
governing each function are influenced by each system. For instance, circle "}" if
the procedure governing a function is established entirely by collective
bargaining agreements and "10" if the procedure governing a function is
established entirely by civil service merit system rules. Circle a number between
"}" and "10" to indicate the relative influence of both systems.
Interpretation of responses to this question is based on the reasoning that prior to The
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enactment of the PECBA and the initiation of collective bargaining, civil service merit
systems were the dominant administrative paradigm. If procedures governing a
particular personnel function are now established by civil service/merit system rules,
responses on the high end of the scale would be expected. To the extent that
procedures governing a particular personnel function are established by collective
bargaining rather than a civil service merit system, responses would be expected to be
at low end of the scale. In that case, higher numerical responses can be said to indicate
the continuation of merit system influence while lower numeric responses indicate the
diminishment of merit system influence and a corresponding increase in the influence
exerted by a collective bargaining system. Table 2 on page 82 lists, in rank order of
influence by civil service/merit system rules, 18 personnel functions and the mean
rating assigned to each of the indicated personnel functions. Mean influence ratings,
indicating the extent to which procedures governing each function are influenced by
the civil service merit system, ranged from a low of 2.3 to a high of 7.9. The mean
rating given to all personnel functions was 4.86. If we adopt the convention that
ratings above 5 indicate the primacy of merit system influence and that ratings below
five indicate the primacy of collective bargaining influence, a clear pattern can be
discerned. The mean ratings of those 18 personnel functions appear to fall into two
distinct groups; those with mean ratings above 6 and those with mean ratings below
3.4. The functions for which procedures are most heavily established by the influence
of the merit system are selection, performance standards, recruitment, training,
classification, and promotion, safety, work assignment, and transfer. Those functions
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were assigned mean ratings of between 5.95 and 7.86, a range of 1.9 points. The
overall mean for this group was 6.95. The functions for which procedures are most
heavily established by the influence of collective bargaining are (in order of influence)
appeal routes, vacation leave, sick leave, dismissal, discipline, dispute resolution,
salary, reduction in force, and pension/retirement. Those functions received mean
ratings of between 2.3 and 3.5, a range of 1.2 points. The overall mean for this group
was 2.8. A statistical test of the significance of the difference between the mean
ratings of these two groups is not appropriate, due to the small size of the sample (two
groups of 9 functions); however, this does not preclude a general conclusion regarding
the apparent placement of these personnel functions into two distinct groups. With the
exception of the safety function, it would appear that those personnel functions rated
as subject to the influence of the merit system are those functions which, according to
the provisions of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970, are essential to the
preservation of the merit system (selection, promotion, classification, work assignment,
and performance appraisal). Also, those functions most strongly rated as influenced by
collective bargaining agreements are those functions which are traditionally thought of
as union concerns (monetary issues and individual security).
Conflict
Another area of interest to this research was a determination of the amount of
conflict personnel managers feel exists between the civil service merit and collective
bargaining systems with respect to the those same 18 areas of personnel
administration. Question number 18 asked respondents to indicate, on a scale of 1 to
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7, the extent to which they felt the civil service merit system and collective bargaining
are in conflict with regard to particular areas of personnel administration. Survey
respondents were asked the following question: "To what extent do you feel the civil
service merit system and collective bargaining are in conflict with regard to the
following areas of personnel administration?" Respondents were asked to rate the
extent of conflict between the two systems according to the following instruction.
Please circle a number to indicate the extent of conflict where a "I" indicates
there is a minimum amount of conflict between the civil service system and
collective bargaining and a "7" indicates that there is severe conflict between the
civil service and collective bargaining.
Answers to this question necessarily reflect personnel manager's perceptions of conflict
rather than its existence on an objective scale. No attempt was made to operationally
define the term conflict. The logic is that if a person professes to feel conflict, then for
that person conflict exists. The purpose of the question was simply to determine if
personnel managers felt the presence of conflict as determined by whatever definition
they chose to apply. No claim is made that this rating indicates any objective
measurement of the existence of conflict or that this perceived level of conflict
indicated by individual managers would be universally recognized by all members of
the organization. The purpose of the question is solely to identify personnel managers'
perceptions of the existence of conflict between the two systems. Table 3, on page 83,
presents in rank order the rating given by respondents when asked to indicate the
extent to which they felt the civil service merit system and collective bargaining are in
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conflict with regard to the indicated areas of personnel administration. Mean conflict
ratings ranged from a low of 1.53 to a high of 3.42. The overall mean conflict rating
for all personnel functions was 2.12. The highest degree of conflict occurred in the
Table 2
Personnel Functions Ranked in Order
of Influence by Merit System
Function Mean Rank Function Mean Rank
Rating Rating
Selection 7.86 1 Pension! Retirement 3.45 10
Performance 7.35 2 Reduction in Force 3.35 11
Standards
Recruitment 7.23 3 Salary 2.83 12
Training 7.15 4 Dispute Resolution 2.73 13
Classification 7 5 Discipline 2.65 14
Promotion 6.91 6 Dismissal 2.64 15
Safety 6.67 7 Sick Leave 2.61 16
Work assignment 6.4 8 Vacation Leave 2.43 17
Transfer 5.95 9 Appeal Routes 2.30 18
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areas of salary, reduction in force, discipline, dismissal, appeal routes, and dispute
resolution (those personnel functions ranked in the top third as sources of conflict).
The lowest degree of conflict occurred in the areas of recruitment, training, selection,
Table 3
Personnel Functions Ranked in Order of Conflict Between
Merit System and Collective Bargaining Influence
Function Mean Rank Function Mean Rank
Rating Rating
Salary 3.42 Performance 2.26 10
Standards
Reduction in Force 3.33 2 Work Assignment 2.21 II
Discipline 3.32 3 Vacation Leave 2.05 12
Dismissal 3.16 4 Sick Leave 2.0 13
Appeal Routes 3.16 5 Pem:;!111lRetirement 1.78 14
Dispute Resolution 3.05 6 SafetJ 1.63 15
Transfer 2.47 7 Selection 1.63 16
Classification 2.42 8 Training 1.58 17
Promotion 2.37 9 Recruitment 1.53 18
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and safety. It is worth noting, however, that even the ratings of the six areas identified
as the greatest source of conflict only ranged from a low of 3.05 to a high of 3.42. It
is not possible to state conclusively from the data at hand, but perhaps these apparent
low levels of conflict can be attributed to the fact that the source of authority for the
establishment of procedures governing each of these functions is well delineated, as
evidenced by the response patterns to item 17 discussed previously.
Open-Ended Response Items
In addition to scaled questions, the survey included two open-ended response
items intended to solicit data of a more qualitative nature. Question 19 asked
respondents to identify, in general terms, what has been the effect of public sector
collective bargaining on the civil service merit system within their county or city.
Question 20 asked respondents to indicate specifically how union discussions,
pressures, or influences have caused management to change or modify its polices,
procedures, or standards in those areas listed in questions 17 and 18. Responses to
these questions ranged from "no effect" or "no change" to the expression of opinions
which seem to indicate that the civil service merit system has been totally replaced by
a system of personnel administration governed entirely by collective bargaining
agreements. Because response to these two questions tended toward redundancy, they
will be discussed together.
By far the most often mentioned effect on or change to the civil service merit
system was that individual merit could not be rewarded and that seniority had become
the basis for decisions regarding promotion or reduction in force. The general tenor of
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these comments was one of concern over the perceived erosion of merit as a basis for
decision making generally as opposed to the absence of merit as the basis of decision
making in anyone area. This theme was mentioned by 10 of the 27 responding
personnel managers in government organizations which have both civil service merit
and collective bargaining systems in place. The 10 responses are as follows:
1) One of our greatest problems with collective bargaining is merit increases or
bonuses for outstanding performance. 2) The statutory requirement to bargain
wages, benefits, and working conditions has resulted in policies that are
inconsistent with directions that management is trying to go. For example, the
union's traditional insistence on basing all decisions on seniority or time in grade
is contrary to basing promotion, pay and other decisions on performance, skill
level, or other factors. 3) Collective Bargaining has removed a merit system from
county policy. It has removed the possibility of the county to recognize
outstanding work and personal initiative with merit pay increases. 4) Greater
emphasis on seniority in selection & promotion process. Preference for in-house
candidates in recruitment. 5) Layoffs based on seniority within classifications.
6) Limits Management ability to reward performance. Limits flexibility in
assigning work, classifying jobs, and in layoff procedures. 7) Seniority and
presumptive competence have taken the place of the merit system. Individual
excellence and initiative are not collective bargaining values. 8) Greater
emphasis on seniority less on performance evaluations. Just cause standard for
discipline and discharge. 9) Work assignments -- in public works can be based
85
on seniority. 10) One of our greatest problems with collective bargaining is
merit increases or bonuses for outstanding performance.
The preceding verbatim responses support the quantitative results obtained in
response to survey item 17, which found reduction in force and salary determination LO
be areas of personnel influenced more by collective bargaining agreements than merit
system rules. Also, when respondents were asked to indicate the level of conflict
existing between collective bargaining and the merit system with respect to 18
personnel functions, salary and reduction in force were the two areas which received
the highest conflict ratings. These open-ended responses also support the outcomes of
question 18, in which personnel administrators noted the greatest source of conflict
between the civil service merit and collective bargaining systems to be in the areas of
salary and reduction in force. The fact that collective bargaining agreements have
come to be the controlling factor in the determination of monetary issues in the public
work force is also in keeping with legislative intent that matters concerning wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment be subject to collective negotiation. In this
respect, we do not believe that it can be said the two systems are incompatible, since
the practical effect has been the implementation of the policy spelled out on the
PECBA. However, we see a potential for incompatibility between the objectives of the
merit and collective bargaining systems in the area of promotion and separation if
seniority, rather than merit or fitness for service, becomes the sole factor in
determining the order of promotion, or layoff in cases of reduction in force.
The theme which was mentioned second most often (by 7 respondents) was,
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ironically, that there was little effect or no change to the merit system as a result of
collective bargaining in their county or city.
The third and forth most frequently mentioned themes indicate concerns over the
two areas of classification/salary range and discipline/dismissal, which were mentioned
four and five times respectively. The content of these themes, although somewhat
similar to the absence of merit criterion theme, was more directly reflective of specific
personnel functions and the process by which these functions are established and
carried out. In the area of classification and salary range, the nature of the comments
concerned the process by which procedures are implemented and decisions are made in
this area is principally influenced by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
in force and not by civil service rule or management discretion. Verbatim responses
reflecting that theme follow:
I) A distinct example of union influence in an area traditionally administered by
personnel and our precious civil service system is the area of dispute over
classification allocation and salary range recommendation. In response to union
interest in developing a fair review process, we established a "classification,
compensation, review panel" of three management employees and three different
union representatives to hear and review employee's requests for reviews over
classification allocation of their position or a salary range recommendation for
that classification. This panel gives their opinion to the Director of Employee
Services who must consider their views in making a final decision. 2) Conflict
between union and civil service regarding the definition of part time and
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temporary positions. 3) In my experience in this county (22 months) the
influence [of collective bargaining] is mainly in salary and benefit areas. 4)
Wages have been higher for those represented than for exempt positions. This is
being remedied but only with expected levels of conflict.
Again, the fact that collective bargaining agreements have come to be the controlling
factor in the determination of monetary issues in the public work force is in keeping
with legislative intent that matters concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment be subject to collective negotiation, and so we see no conflict between
policy objectives and implementation. Also, there appears to be congruence between
responses to this item and responses to question 18, which asked respondents to
indicate the level of conflict they feel exists between collective bargaining and the
civil service merit system with respect to certain personnel functions. The personnel
function which received the highest mean conflict rating was salary.
Concerns voiced about the effects of collective bargaining in the area of
discipline and dismissal were also, predominantly, concerns about process rather than
erosion of merit being the basis for decision making. Still, some element of concern
that personnel actions were based not on individual merit but on collectively
negotiated criteria was voiced. Presentation of those responses follows:
1) Decline in usage of civil service board appeals. Atrophy of personnel policy,
rules, and regulations for both represented and non-represented employees in
matters not covered by collective bargaining contracts. We have, by practice and
through lack of training, in the face of assertive unionization, given away a lot of
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management rights in areas k and 1. [researcher's note: the areas k and I are
discipline and dismissal, respectively]. 2) The single biggest factor for unions in
public sector is job security wherein newly elected department heads would come
in and clean house, bringing in their supporters. To that end, Oregon's at-will
employment law is undermined. Is it bad? The other major factor is binding
interest arbitration for law enforcement. That process is slowly eliminating the
"bargaining" from collective bargaining in favor of going to a judge--bad deal!!
In the areas of reduction in force and discipline procedures. Reduction in force--
primarily eliminated at-will in favor of seniority within classification during any
labor force reduction. Discipline/discharge--added a step in due process to
accommodate unions. Good organizations have always followed a due process
including notice, hearing, decision, post hearing. Now organizations have to build
in the negotiated process. 3) More time is spent in resolving disputes. Union
employee's disputes can go (and have gone) to arbitration, a step not available to
non-union; this step may be the cause of union grievances being
disproportionally higher than non-union. Reduction in force--bumping and recall
and layoff--more complicated and restricted under labor agreement. Discipline
and dismissal--restrictions, more with labor agreement than without. Salary-
-must give unions chance to negotiate salary for new classes. Trial service-
-union wants 6 months, management wants 12 months, for some classes. 4) With
binding arbitration it is very difficult to discipline and discharge employees--it is
also very expensive. ERB does not appear to be in sync with current economic
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conditions. 5) Greater emphasis on seniority, less on performance evaluations.
Just cause standard for discipline and discharge.
The areas of discipline, dismissal, appeal routes, and dispute resolution, respectively,
ranked third, fourth, fifth, and six when respondents indicated the mean level of
conflict existing between collective bargaining and civil service merit system rules for
certain personnel functions. Collective bargaining agreements provide for a grievance
procedure, a mechanism by which to resolve grievances resulting from alleged
violations of the labor agreement. The PECBA provides that public employers "may
enter into a written agreement with the exclusive representative of an appropriate
bargaining unit setting forth a grievance procedure culminating in binding
arbitration. ,,95 Civil service rules do not directly address contract issues, nor is the
grievance procedure established by a written agreement applicable to topics outside of
that agreement. Civil service rules, however, usually do provide a means by which
employees can appeal decisions regarding matters such as discipline and dismissal.
Although in some jurisdictions an employee in a recognized bargaining unit is limited
by the bargaining agreement to pursuing an appeal only through the negotiated
grievance procedure, other jurisdictions allow an employee to pursue the second route
of appeal after exhausting remedies available under the first.
The themes discussed so far have shared a common thread in that they reflect
management dissatisfaction with the impact collective bargaining has had on the civil
service merit system. Two themes, each mentioned only twice, reflect a greater
95 ORS 243.706 (1).
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acceptance of the coexistence of the two means of personnel administration. One
theme suggests that one effect of collective bargaining has been the ability to
stanLmlize practices, and the other theme suggests that labor and management have
begun to form joint work groups to determine certain personnel polices.
Overall, responses to the open-ended survey items appear to support the
quantitative data obtained through scaled questions concerning the amount of influence
each system has on the establishment of procedures and the degree of conflict existing
between the two systems with respect to those procedures. Additionally, both scaled
aJld open-ended responses indicate that the implementation of collective bargaining
legislation has been in keeping with legislative intent. An interesting question, not
directly addressed by the present study, is how Oregon compares to the rest of the
states with respect to its collective bargaining legislation.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER STATES
Because of the lack of other studies, it is very difficult to compare Oregon's
collective bargaining status with that of other states. Perhaps the best reference for
comparison is the study published by Douglas in 1992. Douglas did not explore the
relationship between collective bargaining and civil service at the local government
level but limited the scope of his investigation to the impact of collective bargaining
legislation at the state government level. The primary questions addressed by the
Douglas study were to what extent and in what manner labor relations systems had
been accommodated by legislation dealing with existing civil service systems. Civil
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service merit systems can be protected by legislation which mandates the continuation
of and adherence to the merit system. Douglas found this mechanism to be operational
in nine states. Civil service merit systems may also be protected from influence by
collective bargaining if legislation designates certain topics to be under the exclusive
influence of such systems and not within the scope of collective bargaining. This
approach was found in 10 states. In a third approach, the supremacy of collective
bargaining over the civil service merit system in matters of labor relations could be
specifically outlined by statute. In such cases, collective bargaining agreements enjoy
supremacy, and civil service statutes are deemed subservient to collective bargaining in
tlIOse areas for which collective bargaining is either mandated or permitted. This
arrangement was found in nine states. This was also found by the present study to be
the status of collective bargaining and civil service legislation in Oregon. The fourth
approach to the accommodation of the two systems is the declaration of certain topics
to be reserved as management rights. Oregon's PECBA does not specifically address
management rights. Douglas also found, in every state in which both civil service
merit systems and collective bargaining exist, that civil service merit systems continue
to govern most of the traditional personnel functions such as recruitment, selection,
position classification, and performance appraisal. This is the case in Oregon.
Douglas concluded that although the influence of civil service merit systems on
personnel administration has been diminished by the rise of collective bargaining
legislation, col!ective bargaining has not replaced the civil service merit system as a
means of personnel administration in those states where the two systems coexist and
92
that there appears to be an emergence of dual personnel systems which attempt to
integrate competing aspects of civil service merit and collective bargaining systems.
The obvious question which must be asked in light of the present study is what
direction will Oregon take in the future with respect to the development of these two
systems? Is collective bargaining seen as a complement or an alternative to the civil
service merit system?
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DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to explore the impact which collective bargaining
has had on the civil service merit system in the State of Oregon. The goals were to
describe the relative status of the state's civil service merit and collective bargaining
systems 20 years after the enactment of Oregon's Public Employee Collective
Bargaining Act, to determine the relative extent to which procedures governing most
personnel functions are influenced by merit and collective bargaining systems, and to
attempt to discern the implications of the relationship between the two systems for the
effective administration of public personnel systems in Oregon in the future.
Relative Status and Extent of Influence of the Two Systems
Based on a review of applicable statutes, ERB opinions, and court decisions there
can be no question that the intent of policy makers in the State of Oregon is for the
collective bargaining model to be the dominant means of administering the labor
relations process. The statutory language of ORS 240.321 (2) and (3), in conjunction
with the policy statement contained in ORS 243.656, makes this point perfectly clear.
Additionally, ERB and the courts have consistently ruled that other State statutes as
well as county and local government civil service ordinances governing hours wages
and other conditions of employment are subservient to the authority of the PECBA.
The present study addressed three issues related to that point.
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First, as concerns the issue of home rule, ERB and the courts reasoned that
because the PECBA was enacted after the civil service statues, and because it included
a statement of legislative intent to provide a uniform basis for bargaining, the
legislature intended "all employment relations of organized public employees" to be
governed by the PECBA rather than local civil service commissions. Second,
regarding the issue of whether matters of labor relations between public employers and
public employees are subject to the provisions of the PECBA or other state statutes,
ERB and the courts have consistently ruled that, although there may appear to be a
conflict between two statutes, such matters are subject to the provisions of the
PECBA. In Hockema, the court reasoned that the PECBA takes precedence because
of its more recent enactment. In Lent and Barron, the court reasoned that there was
no conflict between the PECBA and the provisions of the other statutes cited in
challenge to the authority of the PECBA. Third, in response to the question of scope
of bargaining, in AFSCME Locals 2623-A 2623-B and 191-B v. Executive Department
et al. the court ruled that while the State Personnel Division retains the power to group
all job positions into classes and to adopt salary ranges which include maximum,
minimum, and intermediate positions, the establishment of the compensation plan itself
can be a subject for bargaining between the state and labor organizations.
In addition to addressing the question of legislative and judicial intent, This study
also addressed questions surrounding the outcomes associated with the application of
civil service/merit and collective bargaining models of personnel administration.
Survey results which tallied the number of governmental units reporting the presence
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of each system show that collective bargaining agreements are the dominant means of
establishing personnel functions in a majority of local governments. Responses show
that 53 of 64 jurisdictions (78%), including 33 of the responding 34 county
governments and 20 of 34 responding city governments, have established collective
bargaining systems. On the other hand, only 32 of 64 respondents (47%) report the
presence of a merit system. Furthermore, while 27 of the 32 units (84%) which report
the presence of a merit system also engage in collective bargaining, only 32 of the 53
WlitS (60%) which engage in collective bargaining also report the presence of a merit
system.
Finally, this study undertook to identify those areas of personnel activity most
affected by union activity and the existence of collective bargaining agreements. The
most common theme to emerge from open-ended survey items asking the extent to
which collective bargaining has effected the merit system is that collective bargaining
has resulted in the erosion of merit as a decision criteria for promotion and reduction
in force, typically to be replaced by seniority. Another theme expressed was concern
that in the area of classification and salary range, the process by which procedures are
implemented and decisions are made are principally influenced by the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement and not by civil service rules or management
discretion. A third dominant theme that was expressed is that the collective bargaining
model has added complexity to the appeals process. When both civil service rules and
collective bargaining agreements are in force, employees may have access to multiple
avenues of appeal.
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Implications of Administering a Dual Personnel Systems
There are three commonly expressed views concerning resolution of the
collective bargaining/merit system controversy. The first sentiment is that they are
incompatible systems destined for coexistence yet doomed to everlasting conflict. The
second opinion is that, since the two are irreconcilable, one or the other system will
prevail. The third belief is that the two systems are compatible and can exist in a
symbiotic relationship if the merit system is willing to accommodate certain basic
tenets of collective bargaining, such as the principle of bilateral decision making.
Given the results of the present study, we believe development will proceed
along the lines of the third scenario. We feel that the future will see the further
development of a co-determinate model of personnel administration in which primary
decisions about personnel activities will be decided jointly by labor and management
for the following reasons. First, legislative intent is clear with respect to the
superordinate position of the PECBA over other legislation governing labor relations.
Second, based on survey results, there currently appears to be a rather clear
demarcation of influence by each of the two systems in different areas of personnel
administration. The turf, as it were, has been divided. Quite clearly those functions
traditionally thought of as essential to the preservation of the merit system
(recruitment, selection, classification, work assignment, transfer, and establishment of
performance standards) are the personnel functions reported to be most heavily
influenced by civil service merit system procedures. On the other hand, economic and
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individual security issues (pension/retirement, salary, reduction in force, vacation and
sick leave, discipline, dismissal, and appeal routes) which are generally the major
concerns of labor organizations are reported to be most heavily influenced by
collective bargaining agreements. Third, the survey results obtained in this study
indicate that the level of conflict between the two systems over the establishment of
procedures by which to guide these personnel functions is minimal. This does not
mean, however, that there is not potential for conflict under a duel personnel system.
To the extent that a dual system of personnel management exists, administration
of the overall personnel system will remain necessarily complex and burdensome for
the employer. The areas of greatest concern to personnel administrators responding to
this survey are frustration over their inability to reward individual performance on the
basis of merit and the necessity to accept "greatest seniority" as the decision criteria in
times of work force reduction. Even so, although use of this criteria is of concern to
managers, its widespread use seems to indicate at least a grudging acceptance by
management in lieu of another, mutually acceptable, alternative. We would speculate
that if promotion and retention criteria based on merit and viewed both as an objective
and valid assessment of performance could be developed, then unions would agree to
the use of this criteria rather than insisting that public employers rely on seniority as
the major determinant in decisions of promotion and reduction in force.
Another example of an area of potential conflict is that the dual system can
provide two avenues of appeal for those employees covered under both civil service
and collective bargaining. Collective bargaining agreements provide for a mechanism
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by which to resolve grievances resulting from alleged violations of the labor
agreement. Civil service rules also provide a means by which employees can appeal
actions regarding matters such as discipline and dismissal. Although in some
jurisdictions, an employee in a recognized bargaining unit is limited by the bargaining
agreement to pursuing an appeal only through the negotiated grievance procedure,
other jurisdictions allow an employee to pursue the second route of appeal after
exhausting remedies available under the first. This circumstance can lead to additional
complexity and cost of administration, as well as raising questions of equity between
bargaining unit members and those not covered by a labor agreement.
A final area of potential conflict is that some employees see the civil service
merit system as an arm of the administration rather than as a neutral body. Given this,
it may be asking too much for these employees to put aside the adversarial relationship
which often exists between "the union" and "management" and adopt a more
collaborative stance. Collaboration implies trust, yet where the appearance of
neutrality is lacking, trust will be difficult to develop and maintain.
Direction of Future Research
This study presented a description and analysis of the relationship between the
civil service/merit system and collective bargaining models of personnel administration
within the counties and local governmental units within the State of Oregon.
One area of future research suggested by this study is the question of whether a
difference exists with respect to the impact of collective bargaining on the merit
system at the city and county government level. This question was left unanswered by
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the present study due to the small number of governmental organizations which
reported having both systems in place (17 county and 10 city).
A second logical extension of the present research would be to expand the
geographic range of the study. An obvious next step would be to examine collective
bargaining and civil service legislation and to survey administrators in each of the 50
states at the state level of government. A study of this scope would provide a much
better focused picture of the status of public sector collective bargaining and civil
service models of personnel administration throughout the nation than is now currently
available. Another approach would be to survey the balance of the western region of
the United States at both the state and county levels including Washington, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, California, Alaska, and Hawaii in addition to Oregon. This
approach would allow for a comparison of the impact of collective bargaining, as well
as an analysis of the sources of conflict between collective bargaining and the civil
service merit system legislation in "strong" and "weak" collective bargaining states.
A fmal direction of research suggested by the present study is to explore more
fully those areas of personnel administration identified as sources of conflict between
the two systems. What are the root causes of this perceived conflict; is the existence of
this conflict detrimental to the effective administration of public personnel systems,
and if so, and how can the conflict be reduced?
Appendix A
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PSU Department of Urban and Public Affairs Letterhead
Date
Dear Personnel Administrator,
I am asking your help in completing a swvey being conducted through Portland State
University's School of Urban and Public Affairs. This survey is being conducted as
part of my doctoral research and its purpose is to gather information that will allow an
assessment of the effects of collective bargaining on the civil seIVice merit system
throughout the state. Swveys have been sent to personnel administrators and labor
relations specialists in many cities and all 36 counties. When completed, this study
will provide the first comprehensive description of the relationship between the merit
system and public sector collective bargaining in Oregon.
The first section of the suIVey is intended to gather information by which to group
political subdivisions with respect to such factors as population and number of
employees. The second section of the survey solicits information and opinion on the
nature and extent of the impact which collective bargaining may have had on the civil
seIVice system in your jurisdiction. If you have additional information or opinions
which you would like to share, please feel free to attach additional pages to your
response.
In order to make timely use of this information, I need to have it returned to me by
] 1/01/93. A stamped, self addressed envelope is enclosed for this purpose.
Your cooperation in this effort is greatly appreciated. All responses will be considered
confidential unless permission to quote is specifically granted. If you have any
questions please call me at (503) 284-1815. Additionally, if you are willing to be
contacted for further information or would like to be informed of the results of this
study when they are compiled, please indicate this and include your name, address,
and telephone number with your completed survey.
Once again, I thank you for your participation in this sUIVey.
Sincerely,
David Blanchard,
Research Fellow
Portland State University
Personnel Administrator Survey
The impact of collective bargaining on the civil service merit system
1. How many people does your county employ?
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2. Does your county have a merit system?
3. If so, how many county employees are covered by that system?
YES NO
4. Does your county have a civil service system?
5. If so, how many county employees are covered by that ~"Ystem?
YES NO
6. Does your county have a civil service board or commission?
7. If so, how often does that group meet?
8. When was the last time that group met?
9. What topics were discussed the last time this group met?
YES NO
10. Does your county engage in collective bargaining? YES NO
11. How many employees are eligible to be bargaining unit members?
12. How many employees are ineligible to be bargaining unit members?
13. How many employees actually are bargaining unit members?
(include both dues paying and non-union members)
14. How many bargaining units are there in your jurisdiction?
15. How many bargaining agreements is your county a party to?
16. With which labor organizations does your county have bargaining agreements?
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17. To what extent are proc~dures governing the following personnel functions for bargaining unit
employees in your jurisdiction established by collective bargaining agreements and/or civil service
merit system rules? Please circle the number corresponding to the extent to which procedures
governing each function are influenced by each system. For instance, circle "I" if the procedure
governing a function is established entirely by collective bargaining agreements and "10" if the
procedure governing a function is established entirely by civil service merit system rules~ Circle a
number between "I" and "10" to indicate the relative influence of both systems.
Extent to which procedures for the following functions are established under
collective bargaining agreements or merit system rules
Collective Merit
Bargaining system
a. Recruitment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
b. Selection 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c. Promotion 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
d. Classification 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
e. Work Assignment 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
f. Transfer 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
g. Reduction in Force 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
h. Training 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
i. Performance Stndrds 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
j. Dispute resolution 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
k. Discipline 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
I. Dismissal 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ill. Appeal routes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
n. Salary 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
o. Pension \ retirement 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
p. Vacation leave 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
q. Safety 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
r. Sick leave 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
s. Other leave 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(specify)
t. Other functions 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(specify)
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18. To what extent do you feel the civil service merit system and collective bargaining are in conflict
with regard to the following areas of personnel administration?
Please circle a number to indicate the extent of conflict where a "1" indicates there is a minimum
amount of conflict between the civil service system and collective bargaining and a "7" indicates that
there is severe conflict between the civil service and collective bargaining.
Extent to which
civil service and collective bargaining coffilict
Minimum conflict Severe conflict
a. Recruitment 2 3 4 5 6 7
b. Selection 2 3 4 5 6 7
c. Promotion 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Classification 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. Assignment of work 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. Transfer 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. Reduction in force 2 3 4 5 6 7
h. Training 2 3 4 5 6 7
i. Perfonnance Standards 2 3 4 5 6 7
j. Dispute resolution 2 3 4 5 6 7
k. Discipline 2 3 4 5 6 7
I. Dismissal 2 3 4 5 6 7
m. Appeal routes 2 3 4 5 6 7
n. Salary 2 3 4 5 6 7
o. Pension or retirement 2 3 4 5 6 7
p. Vacation leave 2 3 4 5 6 7
q. Safety 2 3 4 5 6 7
r. Sick leave 2 3 4 5 6 7
s. Other leave ) 2 3 4 5 6 7
(specify
t. Other functions 2 3 4 5 6 7
(specify)
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19. In general terms, what has been the effect of public sector collective bargaining on the civil service
merit system within your county?
20. Specifically, how have union discussions, pressures, or influences caused management to change or
modify its policies, procedures, or standards in the areas listed in question 17?
Personnel Administrator Survey
The impact of collective bargaining on the civil service merit system
1. How many people does your city employ?
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2. Does your city have a merit system?
3. If so, how many city employees are covered by that system?
4. Does your city have a civil service system?
5. If so, how many city employees are covered by that system?
YES
YES
NO
NO
6. Does your city have a civil service board or commission?
7. If so, how often does that group meet?
8. When was the last time that group met?
9. What topics were discussed the last time this group met?
YES NO
10. Does your city engage in collective bargaining? YES NO
11. How many employees are eligible to be bargaining unit members?
12. How many employees are ineligible to be bargaining unit members?
13. How many employees actually are bargaining unit members?
(include both dues paying and non-union members)
14. How many bargaining units are there in your jurisdiction?
15. How many bargaining agreements is your city a party to?
16. With which labor organizations does your city have bargaining agreements?
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17. To what extent are procedures governing the following personnel functions for bargaining unit
employees in your jurisdiction established by collective bargaining agreements and/or civil service
merit system rules? Please circle the number corresponding to the extent to which procedures
governing each function are influenced by each system. For instance, circle" I" if the procedure
governing a function is established entirely by collective bargaining agreements and "10" if the
procedure governing a function is established entirely by civil s2rvice merit system rules. Circle a
number between "1" and "10" to indicate the relative influence of both systems.
Extent to which procedures for the following functions are established under
col1ective bargaining agreements or merit system rules
Col1ective Merit
Bargaining system
a. Recruitment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
b. Selection 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
c. Promotion 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
d. Classification 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
e. Work Assignment 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
f. Transfer 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
g. Reduction in Force 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
h. Training 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
i. Performance Stndrds 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
j. Dispute resolution 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
k. Discipline 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. Dismissal 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
m. Appeal routes 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
n. Salary 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
o. Pension \ retirement 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
p. Vacation leave 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
q. Safety 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
r. Sick leave 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
s. Other leave 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(specify)
t. Other functions 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(specify)
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18. To what extent do you feel the civil service merit system and collective bargaining are in conflict
with regard to the following areas of personnel administration?
Please circle a number to indicate the extent of conflict where a "1" indicates there is a minimum
amount of conflict between the civil service system and collective bargaining and a "7" indicates that
there is severe conflict between the civil service and collective bargaining.
Extent to which
civil service and collective bargaining conflict
Minimum conflict Severe conflict
a. Recruitment 2 3 4 5 6 7
b. Selection 2 3 4 5 6 7
c. Promotion 2 3 4 5 6 7
d. Classification 2 3 4 5 6 7
e. Assignment of work 2 3 4 5 6 7
f. Transfer 2 3 4 5 6 7
g. Reduction in force 2 3 4 5 6 7
h. Training 2 3 4 5 6 7
i. Performance Standards 2 3 4 5 6 7
j. Dispute resolution 2 3 4 5 6 7
k. Discipline 2 3 4 5 6 7
I. Dismissal 2 3 4 5 6 7
m. Appeal routes 2 3 4 5 6 7
n. Salary 2 3 4 5 6 "7
o. Pension or retirement 2 3 4 5 6 7
p. Vacation leave 2 3 4 5 6 7
q. Safety 2 3 4 5 6 7
r. Sick leave 2 3 4 5 6 7
s. Other leave ) 2 3 4 5 6 7
(specify
t. Other functions 2 3 4 5 6 7
(specify)
109
19. In general terms, what has been the effect of public sector collective
bargaining on the civil service merit system within your city?
20. Specifically, how have union discussions, pressures, or influences caused
management to change or modify its policies, procedures, or standards in the
areas listed in question 17?
Appendix B
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Prevalence of Merit and Collective Bargaining Systems
COUNlY POP EMP MS CS CB
Gilliam Co. 1750 34 NO NO YES
Sherman Co. 1800 26 NO NO NO
Multnomah Co. 6050 3529 YES YES YES
Wallowa Co. 7150 60 YES NO YES
Grant Co. 8000 120 YES NO YES
Morrow Co. 8100 11 NO NO YES
Jefferson Co. 14600 100 NO NO YES
Crook Co. 15000 118 NO NO YES
Baker Co. 15800 121 NO NO YES
Hood River Co. 17600 175 YES NO YES
Tillamook Co. 22500 230 NO NO YES
Wasco Co. 22600 350 NO YES YES
Union Co. 24000 190 YES NO YES
Lane Co. 24100 1300 YES NO YES
Malheur Co. 26800 150 YES NO YES
Clatsop Co. 33100 170 NO NO YES
Columbia Co. 38800 126 NO YES YES
Lincoln Co. 39600 390 YES NO YES
Polk Co. 53000 190 YES NO YES
Klamath Co. 59400 400 YES NO YES
Umatilla Co. 61100 377 NO NO YES
Coos Co. 62100 398 YES NO YES
Josephine Co. 65400 600 NO NO YES
Yamhill Co. 69200 330 YES NO YES
Benton Co. 72900 350 NO NO YES
Lake Co. 73500 80 NO NO YES
Deschutes Co. 82600 550 YES NO YES
Linn Co. 95000 560 NO NO YES
Douglas Co. 96300 920 NO NO YES
Jackson Co. 152900 1496 YES NO YES
Marion Co. 241500 900 YES NO YES
Curry Co. 293700 i85 NO NO YES
Clackamas Co. 294500 1385 YES NO YES
Washington Co. 340000 1200 YES YES YES
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Prevalence of Merit and Collective Bargaining Systems (cont.)
CITY POP EMP MS CS CB
Albany 280 NO YES YES
Bend 220 YES YES YES
Cannon Beach 30 NO NO YES
Cave Junction 7 YES NO NO
Chiloquin 3 NO NO NO
Clatskanie 16 YES NO YES
Coos Bay 119 NO NO YES
Corvallis 360 YES NO YES
Culver 5 NO NO NO
Dufur 3 NO NO NO
Eagle Point 14 NO NO YES
Enterprise 20 NO NO NO
Eugene 1200 NO NO YES
Gearhart 5 YES NO NO
Gresham 400 NO YES
Lake Oswego 250 YES NO YES
Lowell 4 NO NO NO
Madras 23 NO NO YES
Medford 337 YES NO YES
Mill City 6 NO NO NO
Milwaukie 133 NO YES YES
MOlmt Angel 16 YES NO NO
Portland 5915 NO YES YES
Reedsport 37 YES NO YES
Roseburg 140 YES NO YES
Salem 1200 YES YES YES
Sandy 35 YES NO NO
Scio 7 NO NO NO
Sherwood 22 YES NO NO
Siletz 6 NO NO NO
Willamina 9 YES NO YES
Wilsonville iOO YES NO YES
Winston 18 NO NO YES
Yamhill 6 NO NO NO
